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ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS: HARNESSING
EXPERIENTIAL DATA TO PROMOTE PATIENT
WELFARE
Barbara A. Noah*
A wise man should consider that health is the greatest of human
blessings, and learn how by his own thought to derive benefit
from his illnesses. -Hippocrates 1
In the last two years, five prescription drugs have been withdrawn from
the market and several others have been the subject of intensified warn-
ings to physicians and consumers, all due to the discovery of previously
unforeseen side effects associated with their use. For instance, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) recalled two diet drugs because they
appeared to cause heart valve problems, and it recently withdrew its ap-
proval of a prescription painkiller because of reports associating that
drug with acute liver failure.'
Although such occasional incidents may attract widespread attention,
the problem of adverse drug reactions is pervasive and longstanding. A
1998 study concluded that over 100,000 people die in the United States
each year from adverse reactions to medications, making them the
fourth leading statistical cause of death in this country. Many of these
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1. HIPPOCRATES, 9 REGIMEN IN HEALTH.
2. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, New Painkiller is Withdrawn After 4 Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23,1998, at Al.
3. See Denise Grady, Study Says Thousands Die from Reaction to Medicine, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998, at Al (describing a Journal of the American Medical Association
study that found an additional 2.2 million nonfatal adverse drug reactions in 1994); see also
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/PEMID-90-15, FDA DRUG REVIEW:
POSTAPPROVAL RISKS 1976-85 3 (1990) [hereinafter FDA DRUG REVIEW] (estimating
that over 50% of all new drugs approved by the FDA during the studied years had serious
risks that remained undiscovered until after marketing). Experts disagree about the accu-
racy with which the risk of adverse drug events can be predicted. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HEHS-00-21, ADVERSE DRUG EVENTS: THE
MAGNITUDE OF HEALTH RISK IS UNCERTAIN BECAUSE OF LIMITED INCIDENCE DATA
2 (2000).
4. See Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized
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reactions can be attributed to the expected side effects of potent thera-
peutic agents, but some of these adverse reactions come as a surprise. In
addition to causing significant rates of morbidity and mortality, adverse
drug reactions tend to prolong hospital stays, resulting in increased eco-
nomic burdens on patients and on the health care system. They also
have significant implications for the overall quality of patient care.'
The concept of managed care has transformed the health care system
in the past decade. Managed care magnifies the conflict between health
care resources allocated to individual patients and those remaining for
the total group of potential beneficiaries because the system demands
pre-authorization for the utilization of resources for any individual within
the group.6 This pre-approval mechanism can interfere with a physician's
ability to select treatments based solely on the individual patient's needs
and instead requires that the physician work within standards intended to
serve the needs of the entire group of which the patient is a member.7
Providers have strongly protested the allocation of health services on a
population-wide basis under managed care.8 Perhaps population-based
Patients: A Meta-analysis of Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1202 (1998); see also
John A. Anderson, Allergic Reactions to Drugs and Biological Agents, 268 JAMA 2845,
2845 (1992) (noting that an estimated 2% to 5% of all hospitalizations result from adverse
drug reactions, and that up to 30% of hospitalized patients experience some form of ad-
verse drug reaction). At the same time, two of the leading causes of death have declined
dramatically. See Gina Kolata, Vast Advance is Reported in Preventing Heart Illnesses,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1999, at A15 (noting that mortality rates from heart attacks and
strokes are falling). As the population ages and consequently increases its use of prescrip-
tion medications, adverse drug reactions will account for an even greater share of deaths
in this country. See Barbara A. Noah & David Brushwood, Adverse Drug Reactions in
Elderly Patients: A Systems Approach to Promoting Patient Welfare (Feb. 2000) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
5. See David C. Classen et al., Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: Excess
Length of Stay, Extra Costs, and Attributable Mortality, 277 JAMA 301, 301, 305 (1997)
(concluding that adverse drug events complicated 2.43% of hospital admissions during the
studied period, and that the ADEs increased the length of hospital stays an average of 1.91
days with a resulting increased average cost of $2262); see also David W. Bates et al., The
Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients, 277 JAMA 307, 307, 311 (1997)
(finding a 2.2 day average additional length of stay for patients with ADEs, resulting in an
increased average cost of $2595 by analyzing 4108 random hospital admissions).
6. See William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 HouS. L. REV. 1529, 1536
(1999).
7. See George J. Annas, A National Bill of Patients' Rights, 338 NEw ENG. J. MED.
695, 696-97 (1998) (describing the "core response to the perception that health plans had
gone too far. . . [and] an attempt to put the power to make decisions back in the context
of a consensual and informed doctor-patient relationship freed from financial conflicts of
interest").
8. See, e.g., Jerome P. Kassirer, Editorial, Managing Care-Should We Adopt a New
Ethic?, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 397, 397-98 (1998) ("I believe that intentionally providing
minimally acceptable care to some for the benefit of others in an arbitrary group-let
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medicine threatens the integrity and quality of medical care, but the col-
lection, analysis, and dissemination of information relating to adverse
drug reactions demands an emphasis on population-based outcomes and
utility. In order to improve the quality of patient care that utilizes pre-
scription drugs, the health care system must have access to meaningful
safety data derived from large population trials and records of clinical
outcomes. This Article will suggest ways to increase both the quality and
quantity of drug safety data.
Recent changes in the marketing of pharmaceutical products will exac-
erbate drug safety problems in the future. With the advent of direct ad-
vertising to consumers,9 patients increasingly demand and receive new
prescription drugs immediately upon initial FDA approval.' ° Even if
physicians manage to resist patients anxious for the latest, and therefore,
least time-tested pharmaceuticals, overall use will increase in response to
sophisticated advertising campaigns. As the consumer demand for old
and new prescription drugs continues to rise," the importance of post-
alone for the benefit of the bottom line-is wrong...."). Dr. Kassirer opined that "[i]f we
capitulate to an ethic of the group rather than the individual ... we risk becoming eco-
nomic agents instead of health professionals." Id at 398.
9. See Elyse Tanouye, Drug Dependency: U.S. Has Developed an Expensive Habit;
Now, How to Pay for It?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at Al (noting that drug marketers
spent $1.3 billion on consumer advertising in 1998, a seven-fold increase over spending
five years before and that, since 1997, the FDA has permitted full-scale television adver-
tising of prescription drugs directly to consumers); see also Center for Drug Evaluation &
Research, FDA, Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements
(last modified Aug. 8, 1997) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/index.htm> (providing
that television advertisements may specify the indications for use of a prescription drug if
accompanied by warnings of the product's main risks and a cross-reference to more de-
tailed cautionary information in printed form); Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-
Directed Broadcast Advertisements; Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171, 43,172 (1997)
("This draft guidance is intended to provide consumers with adequate communication of
required risk information, while facilitating the process used by sponsors to advertise their
products to consumers."). The FDA recently finalized the draft guidance, with minor
changes. See Guidance for Industry on Consumer-Directed Advertisements; Availability,
64 Fed. Reg. 43,197 (1999). For a thorough discussion of this development, see Lars Noah,
Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Is-
sues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141 (1997).
10. See Charles Marwick, Drug Safety Takes Cooperation, 282 JAMA 315, 316 (1999)
(noting that direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs has accelerated wide-
spread use of drugs, especially new ones); see also Thomas M. Burton & Yumiko Ono,
Campaign for Prozac Targets Consumers, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1997, at B1 (reporting that
consumer demand for certain types of drugs, such as obesity treatments, Viagra for erec-
tile dysfunction, anti-depressants, hair growth drugs, and certain allergy medications has
increased dramatically); Viagra by the Numbers, HEALTH ADVOC., Summer 1999, at 8
(noting that physicians wrote 598,000 prescriptions for Viagra in the first month of its
marketing although the manufacturer tested the drug on only approximately 3000 men
during clinical trials).
11. See Tanouye, supra note 9, at Al (stating that consumer demand for drugs such as
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approval monitoring for adverse drug reactions will continue to grow.
Drug safety monitoring is, by necessity, a cooperative venture among
the FDA, pharmaceutical manufacturers, physicians, and patients. Even
so, many physicians and members of the general public have begun to
question why the FDA failed to detect some of these recent problems be-
fore approving the drugs for marketing. Critics also suggest that the
FDA's traditional emphasis on pre-approval review comes at the expense
of adequate post-approval surveillance. Each year, the FDA receives
approximately 230,000 reports of possible adverse drug reactions, and
approximately ten percent of these reports raise concerns about serious
reactions that pre-approval clinical trials failed to detect.13 Yet the FDA
only devotes the equivalent of fifty-five full-time employees to post-
approval surveillance, as compared with over 1700 full-time equivalents
engaged in pre-market review of new drug applications. 4 Moreover,
only a small percentage of those employees responsible for post-approval
review have advanced degrees in a specialty relevant to the surveillance
of pharmaceutical products, such as epidemiology or biostatistics."
Another recent development may magnify the drug surveillance prob-
lem. Even if this allocation of scarce regulatory resources worked rela-
Viagra and Claritin caused drug sales to rise 16.6% in 1998, an increase that was more
than four times that of overall health care spending); see also Americans Hooked on Pre-
scriptions?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 30, 1999, at 12A (predicting that an estimated
three billion prescriptions will be filled in 1999, an increase of 9% over 1998).
12. See Denise Grady, In a Survey, the F.D.A. is Accused of Hasty Approval of Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at A25 (describing a survey of FDA-employed physicians who
expressed concerns that the agency had succumbed to public interest and industry pres-
sures to approve new drugs too quickly and/or inappropriately); Gina Kolata, The F.D.A.
Approves a Drug: Then What?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at F1 (noting criticism of the re-
porting system from a leading epidemiologist who suggested that, although reports from
physicians are the leading means for informing the FDA about drug reactions, "most doc-
tors don't know the system exists"); see also Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages
and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1347-52 (1993) (describing how the FDA
approved a number of dangerous prescription drug products for marketing, and criticizing
the FDA's licensing process for drugs).
13. See CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., 1998 REPORT TO THE NATION 22 (1998) [hereinafter CDER REPORT TO
THE NATION], available in <http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rptntn98.pdf> (noting that in
fiscal year 1998, the FDA received approximately 232,470 reports of suspected drug-
related adverse events); see also Kolata, supra note 12, at F8 (describing how the agency
responds to reports about serious drug reactions by researching computer databases such
as Medicare's patient files to determine whether the reaction is common and by consulting
with a private company that tabulates information about drug sales to provide the basis for
a frequency analysis).
14. See CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, FACT BOOK 1997 32
(1997), available in <http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/cderfact.pdf>.
15. See Kolata, supra note 12, at F8.
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tively well in the past, the FDA has responded to pressures from patient
advocates and the pharmaceutical industry to accelerate the drug ap-
proval process. The new fast-track approval system, combined with new
user fees that provide an economic incentive to approve new drugs more
quickly, has increased the pressure on an already inadequate adverse
drug reaction monitoring system." Although many new drug applica-
tions now pass through the FDA review process in significantly less time,
and sometimes under relaxed regulatory standards, Congress has not
provided for any enhanced post-approval resources to monitor the safety
of the rapidly increasing stream of new drugs entering the market.
In May 1999, the FDA released a lengthy report on this subject, enti-
tled Managing the Risks from Medical Product Use: Creating a Risk
Management Framework." In part a response to widespread criticisms
prompted by the FDA's recent string of highly publicized drug with-
drawals, the report includes a detailed audit of the agency's performance
in monitoring spontaneous reports of adverse product events. Although
a fuller discussion of its findings will appear later in this Article, the re-
port generally paints a favorable picture of the FDA's performance. It
suggests moderate reforms, asks Congress for additional resources, and
implores health professionals and pharmaceutical manufacturers to take
their obligations to patients seriously.' 9 The FDA makes important con-
cessions in the report about weaknesses in the post-approval reporting
system, but its overall message appears designed to reassure.
This Article suggests a less optimistic vision of the status quo. Part I
evaluates the pre-approval and post-approval regulatory framework gov-
erning prescription drugs, and the FDA's spontaneous reporting system
for adverse events, as it contrasts that system with the regulatory mecha-
nisms used to monitor risks associated with other products. Part II sum-
marizes the recent series of prescription drug marketing withdrawals
16. FDA scientists recently concluded that the shortened review times could not ac-
count for the removal of five prescription drugs from the market during a 12-month period
and that the FDA's pre- and post-approval drug review procedures currently are ade-
quate. See Michael A. Friedman et al., The Safety of Newly Approved Medicines: Do Re-
cent Market Removals Mean There is a Problem?, 281 JAMA 1728, 1728, 1730, 1733-34
(1999). Although the authors may be correct in their assertion that this particular cluster
of drug withdrawals is unrelated to accelerated review procedures, this does not prove the
obverse assertion-that the post-approval monitoring procedures adequately address
problems of unexpected adverse drug reactions.
17. See infra Part I.B.3.
18. FDA U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MANAGING THE RISKS FROM
MEDICAL PRODUCT USE: CREATING A RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, available in
<http//www.fda.gov/o/dtfm/l999report.html> [hereinafter RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK].
19. See id. at 12-15, 22, 53, 67.
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prompted by reports of unexpected adverse reactions. Finally, Part III
offers some possible solutions designed to improve the efficiency of post-
approval surveillance so that fewer patients will suffer the consequences
of unexpected adverse drug reactions and interactions. This Article con-
cludes that the existing regulatory system requires fundamental repriori-
tization and more substantial structural reforms in order to avoid a trou-
bling replay of recent prescription drug withdrawals. The proposed
reforms may help to enhance a physician's ability to provide quality pa-
tient care based on optimal knowledge of the safety and efficacy of
pharmaceutical products.
I. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
When filing a new drug application (NDA) with the FDA, the sponsor
must submit evidence of the new drug's safety and effectiveness. The
NDA must include all known information about the drug, including evi-
dence from animal studies and human clinical trials about safety risks or
ineffectiveness. The FDA then directs one of its advisory committees to
consider the application and to recommend approval or disapproval of
the NDA based on the committee's assessment of the drug's safety and
effectiveness. This evaluation calls for a weighing of the risks and bene-
fits of use. Once an approved drug becomes available on the market, the
sponsor must submit reports of any adverse events associated with the
drug and may be required to make labeling changes to reflect new risk
information.
Drugs may cause unwanted side effects in patients for a variety of rea-
sons. Obviously, potent therapeutic agents entail some intrinsic risks. In
addition, a drug may interact in an unforeseen way with another drug
taken by a patient, or it may cause a reaction due to some particular sen-
sitivity of the patient. Patients may also, because of a medication error,
receive either the wrong drug or an improper dosage of the correct drug,
and either event may result in unforeseen side effects.20 Adverse effects
also arise with the use of other therapeutic interventions, such as medical
devices, or from ordinary consumer products, such as foods and cosmet-
ics. Although this Article draws brief comparisons to the safety moni-
toring systems for several other classes of products, it focuses on pre-
scription drugs.
Pharmaceutical products may cause undesirable side effects for a vari-
20. See Ashish K. Jha et al., Identifying Adverse Drug Events: Development of a
Computer-based Monitor and Comparison with Chart Review and Stimulated Voluntary
Report, 5 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS Ass'N 305, 306-07 (1998) (describing methods for
detecting preventable adverse drug events, including medication errors).
[Vol. 49:449
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ety of reasons, but not all of these effects qualify as adverse reactions.
The World Health Organization defines an "adverse drug reaction"
(ADR) as "an effect which is noxious and unintended, and which occurs
at doses used in many for prophylaxis, diagnosis, or therapy., 2' This
definition excludes prescribing and dispensing errors and overdoses. The
more inclusive term "adverse drug event" (ADE) refers to "an injury re-
sulting from medical intervention related to a drug," including unpre-
dictable side effects of drugs (such as a skin rash or anaphalaxis), fore-
seeable side effects such as nausea with chemotherapy, and unwanted
effects resulting from errors in prescribing, dispensing, or administering
drugs.22 This Article focuses on the narrower category of adverse drug
reactions, and particularly on previously unknown ADRs associated with
new drugs.
All prescription drugs have side effects. 3 Most of the time, the thera-
peutic benefits of a drug outweigh its potential detrimental effects. This
risk-benefit calculus constitutes a fundamental part of the overall deci-
sion about whether to permit the marketing of a new drug. Once a drug
becomes available for sale, the health care provider makes an assessment
about the likely usefulness of the drug for the particular patient, includ-
ing a determination of whether the drug might be contraindicated for use
in that patient due to some other health problem. In addition, the health
care provider attempts to determine whether the drug may interact with
other drugs that the patient is taking. Much of the prescribing decision is
based on a combination of trust in the rigor of the pre-approval process
and the physician's understanding of the drug's safety and effectiveness
21. See id. at 306.
22. See id.; see also Lazarou et al., supra note 4, at 1200 (describing the definitions of
"adverse drug event" and "adverse drug reaction," and choosing to focus on ADRs in or-
der to exclude from consideration injuries caused by drugs that were improperly pre-
scribed or administered). The FDA defines an adverse drug experience as:
Any adverse event associated with the use of a drug in humans, whether or not
considered drug related, including the following: An adverse event occurring in
the course of the use of a drug product in professional practice; an adverse event
occurring from drug overdose whether accidental or intentional; an adverse
event occurring from drug abuse; an adverse event occurring from drug with-
drawal; and any failure of expected pharmacological action.
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a)(1999).
23. Cf 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(1994) (providing that a drug which, "because of its tox-
icity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral
measures necessary to its use, is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practi-
tioner licensed by law to administer such a drug ... shall be dispensed only" by prescrip-
tion); ALFRED G. GILMAN ET AL., GOODMAN AND GILMAN's THE PHARMACOLOGICAL
BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 1083 (8th ed. 1990) (describing anaphylactic reactions to peni-
cillin that occur in approximately 300 people--0.001% of treated patients-each year).
2000]
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based on clinical experience and on the relevant medical literature.24
A. Pre-approval Process
Tremendous effort goes into the preparation and review of applica-
tions for the approval of new drugs in this country. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers may spend up to $500 million to develop a new drug, with
human clinical trials accounting for at least thirty percent of the total re-
search budget." After investing a substantial amount of time and re-
sources in animal studies and other preliminary data gathering, a phar-
maceutical company must see the drug through controlled clinical trials
as required by the FDA's new drug approval process. The development
process for a new drug takes an average of 14.7 years, from the early re-
search and pre-clinical trials through the multi-stage clinical trials process
and FDA approval of the NDA." The following section briefly describes
the NDA procedure along with some of the recent amendments to the
FDA's enabling statute that permit accelerated new drug approval under
certain circumstances.
1. Basic Licensing Requirements
Beginning in 1938, the FDA's governing statute has required that the
agency review all "new drugs" for safety prior to marketing. Under the
original provision, applications for approval to market new drugs auto-
24. See Lars Noah, Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review: Publication as a Proxy for
Regulatory Decisionmaking, 59 U. PITr. L. REV. 677, 695 n.77, 704 n.117 (1998). In a
sense, the FDA's formal system of monitoring and reporting is supplemented by an infor-
mal discourse within the medical community about the apparent side effects associated
with newly-marketed drugs. See, e.g., Sildenafil in the Treatment of Erectile Dysfunction,
339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 699, 699-702 (1998) (series of letters to the editor from physicians
discussing early clinical experience with Viagra).
25. See Robert Langreth, Recall of a Popular Roche Drug Raises Questions on Test-
ing, Approval Process, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1998, at B16; see also Robert Langreth, Drug
Marketing Drives Many Clinical Trials, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at A10 (reporting that
clinical-trial costs increased to $7 billion, or almost 40% of the annual U.S. industry re-
search budget). In 1998, analysts estimated that drug companies would spend approxi-
mately $21 billion on research and development costs and would earn approximately $100
billion at the retail level. See Tanouye, supra note 9, at Al.
26. See Richard J. Findlay, Originator Drug Development, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
227, 227-28 (1999) (describing the new drug development process, and providing a time-
line depicting the length of the various development stages).
27. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) defined a "new drug" as "[a]ny
drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized,
among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and
effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, rec-
ommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof." Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 675, § 201(p)(1),
52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1994)).
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matically went into effect after sixty days, unless the FDA extended the
review period and notified the applicant 8' In 1962, Congress amended
the original Act to create a pre-approval system for new chemical entities
under which the NDA sponsor must prove the new drug's safety and ef-
fectiveness for its intended use prior to marketing.29 Most importantly,
the 1962 Amendments require that the manufacturers prove the safety
and effectiveness of a drug by "substantial evidence," defined in the stat-
ute as "evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investiga-
tions, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified.., to evaluate
the effectiveness of the drug involved." 3
New drugs typically must pass through several phases of development
and testing in order to satisfy the NDA requirements. First, the sponsor
must perform a variety of pre-clinical tests to evaluate the drug's toxicity
and pharmacokinetic properties. Once the sponsor has gathered this
preliminary data, it can apply for investigational new drug (IND) desig-
nation,3 which allows the sponsor to begin clinical trials. 2 The sponsor
must conduct three phases of pre-approval clinical trials in order to sat-
isfy the NDA requirements. During Phase I, the sponsor tests the drug
for safety in humans with an emphasis on determining the pharmacologi-
cal action of the drug. If a new chemical entity passes this initial hurdle,
Phase II trials study the drug in patients with the relevant disease in or-
28. See id. § 505(c), 52 Stat. at 1052; see also David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 40 n.232 (1939).
29. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(d), 76 Stat. 780, 781
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). Congress passed the 1962
Amendments in response to the Thalidomide tragedy of the early 1960s. See Note, Drug
Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185, 191 n.45, 192 (1971). The
FDA also subjected drugs first marketed prior to 1962 to a complex retrospective review
procedure as a prerequisite for continued marketing. This brief summary of the law gov-
erning the new drug approval process focuses on the law applicable to drugs that are new
to the market; it does not include a discussion of the law governing the continued market-
ing or safety monitoring of drugs first introduced prior to 1962. For a detailed discussion
of how the current new drug approval process evolved from earlier approaches, see Rich-
ard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L.
REv. 1753, 1761-76 (1996).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1994). Adequate and well-controlled studies generally must
include independent, double-blind clinical trials. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(i) (1999)
("A placebo-controlled study ... usually includes randomization and blinding of patients
or investigators, or both.").
31. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (providing the IND application content and format). The
IND application must contain, among other things, all information about the drug's safety
and effectiveness based on animal studies and trials or marketing experience in other
countries. See id. § 312.23(a)(3)-(5).
32. See Findlay, supra note 26, at 227 (describing the early drug research process).
20001
Catholic University Law Review
der to identify the lowest effective doses that will produce the desired re-
sult. Finally, Phase III trials study the drug's efficacy and side effects in a
larger study population, typically from several hundred to several thou-
sand subjects. The information derived from Phase III studies provides
the basis for FDA reviewers to evaluate the risk-benefit ratio for the
drug.33 In performing the risk-benefit calculus, the FDA recognizes that
even efficacious and relatively safe drugs carry the risk of side effects for
some patients, but that a small overall risk may be justified if the new
drug promises significant potential benefits to the targeted class of pa-
tients.34
2. Inherent Limitations
The FDA acknowledges that pre-marketing human clinical studies
have inherent limitations. Their relatively short duration, narrow subject
population, and small size, among other things, limit the ability of these
studies to uncover rare or delayed adverse reactions or drug interac-
tions.35 "It is simply not possible to identify all the side effects of drugs
before they are marketed. The difficulty is not a failure of the ... drug
approval process; it is the expected consequence of the biologic diversity
33. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (describing clinical trials phases); see also Findlay, supra
note 26, at 227-28 (describing the clinical trials phases and providing estimates for the
length of time typically required to complete each phase).
34. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Man-
agement in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 304-05 (1985) (discussing how the overall
benefits from a drug outweigh the drug's small risks because the alternative of keeping the
drug off the market will harm a greater number of patients).
35. See FDA, The Clinical Impact of Adverse Event Reporting (visited Feb. 21, 2000)
<http://www.fda.govmedwatch/articles/medcont/postmkt.htm> [hereinafter Medwatch
Postmarketing Surveillance] (describing the "intrinsic limitations to pre-marketing human
clinical trials with respect to their ability to detect adverse events"). The typical pre-
approval clinical trial by definition cannot detect delayed or long latency adverse reac-
tions. See, e.g., Arthur L. Herbst et al., Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina: Association of
Maternal Stilbestrol Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 878, 880 (1971) (describing the latent effect of DES on the daughters of women who
took the drug while pregnant, and speculating that more tumors may occur in the exposed
population as it matures). Some drug manufacturers choose to engage in additional pre-
and post-marketing human trials in order to gain FDA approval of new uses to make fa-
vorable claims about the relative efficacy of the newly-approved drug compared to others
available in its class. See Langreth, supra note 25, at A10. Although the number of these
kinds of trials appears to be growing, such trials focus on efficacy rather than safety, see
Joseph A. DiMasi et al., New Indications for Already Approved Drugs: An Analysis of
Regulatory Review Times, 31 J. CLIN. PHARMACOL. 205, 205 (1991) (explaining that "ex-
tensive toxicity and safety evaluation would generally not be required for supplemental
indication reviews"), and the trend does not appear to have contributed to an improved
safety record for new pharmaceutical products.
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of humans .... ,36 The FDA's regulations classify side effects as "rare" if
they occur at a frequency of less than 1-in-1000.37 According to the
FDA's statistics, in order to have a ninety-five percent chance of detect-
ing an adverse reaction with an incidence of 1-in-1000, a study must en-
roll at least 3000 patients. Because clinical trials typically involve no
more than 3000 to 4000 individuals prior to marketing, the studies will
only detect adverse reactions that occur at a rate of 1-in-1000 or higher. 
1
In contrast, post-approval monitoring detects problems that do not
arise in the carefully controlled environment of pre-market clinical trials.
Once a drug becomes available for general use, a wide variety of patients
with varying health conditions may take the drug, often in combination
with other prescriptions. In particular, post-approval (Phase IV) studies
can be useful for a variety of purposes, including (1) identifying and ad-
justing optimal dosage for the drug product; (2) confirming the safety of
the product and identifying new risks; (3) evaluating the product's safety
and efficacy in special populations such as pediatric or elderly patients;
and (4) discovering new uses for the product.39
In many instances, these studies may provide the first point at which
health care providers, manufacturers, and the FDA can gather meaning-
ful information about potential drug safety problems in large patient
populations.4 The problem of drug interactions, along with other con-
36. Alastair J.J. Wood et al., Making Medicines Safer-The Need for an Independent
Drug Safety Board, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1851, 1852 (1998).
37. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(g)(2) (1999). The FDA has, on occasion, taken regulatory
action in response to adverse reactions occurring at a frequency of less than 1 in 1000. For
example, the agency has determined that toxic shock syndrome (TSS) associated with
tampon use occurs at the rate of approximately 1 in 10,000 tampon users annually. See
Menstrual Tampons; User Labeling, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,982 (1982). Though a TSS reaction is
"rare" by FDA standards, the agency requires consumer warnings about the risks. See
21 C.F.R. § 801.430(c)-(d) (1999) (providing for tampon package warnings).
38. See id.; see also American Med. Ass'n, Reporting Adverse Drug and Medical De-
vice Events: Report of the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 49 FOOD &
DRUG. L.J. 359, 360 (1994) (noting that, "in order to detect the difference between an ad-
verse reaction incidence rate of 1/5000 and 1/10,000, approximately 306,000 patients would
have to be observed," and emphasizing the importance of spontaneous adverse reporting
by physicians); RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 43 (describing the
International Conference for Harmonization (ICH) recommendation of a baseline patient
sample size of 1500 participants studied over a six-month period to identify adverse reac-
tions that occur at a level of one percent).
39. See Raymond Woosley, Opportunities in Phase IV to Improve Drug Development,
52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 185, 185 (1997). It is unclear whether the FDA has the authority to
require Phase IV studies from sponsors as a condition of NDA approval. The agency as-
serts such authority, however, with regard to drugs on the market without an approved
NDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 310.303(b).
40. See New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7471 (1985) ("The
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founding variables such as patient lifestyle habits (e.g., alcohol use and
smoking) or multiple disease conditions, also becomes much more pro-
nounced and traceable once a drug is generally marketed or studied for-
mally in large Phase IV trials. As a bonus, such improved monitoring
might also help to uncover what might be called "beneficial drug reac-
tions"-previously unknown beneficial uses of prescription drugs that
clinicians discover serendipitously.
Wholly apart from the problems associated with small numbers of en-
rollees, pre-approval clinical trials have historically enrolled unrepresen-
tative samples of patient populations. Researchers traditionally ex-
cluded-or included only in very limited numbers-women, minorities,
children, and the elderly in clinical studies of new drugs.4 ' Although the
FDA now recognizes this limitation and encourages greater diversity in
clinical trial subjects, 43 the overall numbers of subjects enrolled in a study
have not increased. Indeed, with this fractionalization, infrequent ADRs
that do not arise with the same frequency in minority or vulnerable
populations will prove even more elusive and difficult to predict or detect
for any group of patients."
Thus, the product's labeling at the time of marketing approval only
much larger patient population and longer period of use associated with the marketing of
a drug provides, for the first time, the opportunity to collect information on rare, latent,
and long-term effects, some of which may be serious.").
41. See Gina Kolata, Drugs that Deliver More than Originally Promised, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1998, § 4, at 3; Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, FDA DRUG
BUL., Apr. 1982, at 4-6. For example, the drug minoxidil was originally indicated for use
in treating certain heart conditions; patients then realized that the drug had the additional
effect of inhibiting hair loss. See id. The drug is now marketed for hair loss prevention
under the brand name Rogaine. See Gina Kolata, Hair-Growth Drug Approved, the First
Cleared in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1988, at Al.
42. See Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care, 35 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 135, 152-54 (1998) (describing the difficulties of extrapolating information
about a drug's safety for the population at-large from data derived from white males).
43. See, e.g., CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDELINE FOR INDUSTRY, STUDIES IN SUPPORT OF
SPECIAL POPULATIONS: GERIATRICS 3 (1994); CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND
RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDELINE FOR THE STUDY OF
DRUGS LIKELY TO BE USED IN THE ELDERLY 6-7 (1989); FDA, Guidelines for the Study
and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs (Docket No.
93D-0236) (1993), available in <http:/www.nih.gov/grants/oprr/humansubjects/guidance/
58fr39406.htm>; Robert Pear, President to Order Drug Makers to Conduct Pediatric Stud-
ies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at A17 (noting that only 42% of drugs routinely used in
treating children have been studied in pediatric trials).
44. In other words, a clinical trial that studies 3000 white males will detect more in-
frequent ADRs in this relatively large and homogenous group. By comparison, a study
that consists of 1800 white males, 900 white females, 200 African-American males, and 100




represents what is known about the drug's risks and side effects based on
the narrow parameters of relatively small clinical trials.4'5 The FDA, in-
dustry, and health care providers obviously must monitor new drugs
carefully and track adverse events associated with these drugs once they
become generally available. As experience accumulates, the FDA may
demand labeling revisions to reflect newly-discovered side effects or in-
teractions with other prescription or nonprescription drugs, including
disclosure of side effects occurring at much lower frequencies. 6 Al-
though the American public predictably recoils at any suggestion that pa-
tients continue to act as "guinea pigs" after new drug approval, real
world use by a large and diverse patient population over a longer period
of time provides the only true test of a drug's safety.47
3. Recent Developments
Several relatively recent revisions to the FDA's regulations and ena-
bling statute now allow for the accelerated review of NDAs under certain
circumstances. In 1996 and 1997, the agency approved ninety-two new
drugs, almost double the number of approvals in the previous year.48
During 1998 and 1999, five prescription drugs were removed from the
market, a record number for this short period of time, and critics blame
the accelerated review process for creating this consumer hazard.49 The
mechanisms described below that accelerate the pre-approval process in-
crease the rate at which new drugs enter the market each year and, there-
45. See Medwatch Postmarketing Surveillance, supra note 35, at 1-2; see also Annetine
C. Gelijns et al., Capturing the Unexpected Benefits of Medical Research, 339 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 693, 693-98 (1998) ("The end of the research-and-development process does not en-
tail the elimination of all, or even most, of the uncertainties surrounding medical innova-
tion.").
46. See Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" from
the "Need to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 327-30
(1994).
47. According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report, approximately half of
the 198 drugs approved by the FDA between 1976 and 1985 were accompanied by the dis-
covery of serious post-approval risks, based on labeling changes. Yet, all but six of the
drugs were still on the market in 1989 because of the FDA's determination that the drugs'
benefits continued to outweigh their risks. See FDA DRUG REVIEW, supra note 3, at 3.
48. See Wood et al., supra note 36, at 1851.
49. See John Schwartz, Is FDA Too Quick to Clear Drugs?, WASH. POST, Mar. 23,
1999, at Al. The FDA responded to this concern by pointing out that it has not lowered
its safety standards, adding that it is impossible to eliminate the risks associated with pre-
scription drugs. See id. Another commentator, who directs the Tufts University Center
for the Study of Drug Development, has noted that the number of drugs recalled recently
is consistent with the historic two to three percent withdrawal rate for new drugs. See id.
at A8.
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fore, provide patients and their physicians with an increased number of
treatment options. At the same time, however, the post-approval safety
monitoring system attempts to capture and respond to the increased
number of reports of adverse reactions associated with these new drugs.
Therefore, some of the recent revisions to the new drug approval process
may exacerbate the existing problems associated with detecting adverse
reactions and interactions unintentionally. Although statutory changes
have improved the efficiency of the NDA process, these accelerated re-
view procedures and incentives place an increased burden on the FDA's
post-approval safety review mechanisms that the agency may not be
equipped to handle.
First, in 1988, the FDA promulgated regulations to establish an expe-
dited new drug approval process for certain types of drug therapies.0
Under these procedures, new drugs intended to treat life-threatening and
seriously debilitating illnesses (such as AIDS and cancer) may receive
provisional marketing approval with a weaker body of evidence demon-
strating effectiveness than normally required in the NDA process. Un-
der this expedited approval system, qualifying drugs may reach the mar-
ket after two, instead of three, phases of human clinical trials;52 although
the FDA can demand post-approval studies to discover additional infor-
mation about the drug's safety and optimal use. 3 This approach repre-
sents a willingness to accept less data demonstrating effectiveness in cir-
cumstances where patients desperately need new alternative therapies to
survive. The FDA focuses primarily on ensuring safety with the hope
that the drugs will prove efficacious as well. Foregoing Phase III trials,
however, reduces the quantum of safety data. Phase III trials perform an
essential function by enrolling the largest numbers of patients, and
studying both efficacy and safety. Accordingly, these studies typically
provide valuable safety data on new drugs.54
In 1992, the FDA promulgated regulations that allowed for the accel-
erated approval of drugs to treat serious or life-threatening illnesses
"that provide meaningful therapeutic benefit to patients over existing
treatments."5 The FDA permits the use of "surrogate marker evidence"
50. See Investigational New Drug Application, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,516, 41,523-24 (1998)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312(E) (1999)).
51. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.80 (1999) (noting that accelerated review is especially appro-
priate where "no satisfactory alternative therapy exists").
52. See id. § 312.82.
53. See id. § 312.85.
54. See id. § 312.21.
55. Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942,
58,958 (1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314 & 601 (1999)).
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for these drugs during Phase III trials." The agency predicates its will-
ingness to relax its scientific evidence requirements in these cases on,
among other things, a requirement that the sponsor conducts post-
approval studies relating the surrogate markers to clinical endpoints."
Manufacturers must conduct these studies with "due diligence" and use
the data obtained to: (1) verify the drug's clinical benefit; (2) describe in
greater detail the relationship between the surrogate endpoint and the
intended benefit; or (3) simply explain how the intended clinical benefit,
18if achieved, affects long-term patient outcomes. In 1997, Congress be-
latedly authorized these "fast-track" procedures.59 These procedures,
like the expedited approval regulations described above, could increase
the likelihood of errors or omissions in the pre-approval process. The
requirement for structured post-approval trials, however, creates an ad-
ditional safeguard over the traditional NDA approval model.
Congress also has altered the relative allocation of resources to the
drug approval process in ways that may burden the FDA's post-approval
monitoring system. Under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992
(PDUFA),6° NDA sponsors pay a substantial user fee.6' In exchange for
the authority to collect user fees, the agency agreed to spend user fee
56. See id. at 58,943-44 (responding to comments, and noting that "approval based on
surrogate endpoints is not new, although the issue has not previously been considered in
regulations"). The term "surrogate marker" refers to a clinical indicator, such as CD4 cell
counts in AIDS patients, that can be used to predict the overall effectiveness of a given
drug therapy for a targeted condition. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.510, 601.41 (1999).
57. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (describing approval based on adequate and well-
controlled clinical trials "establishing that the drug product has an effect on a surrogate
endpoint that is reasonably likely ... to predict clinical benefit"); see also Larry R. Ver-
steegh, Science and Regulatory Rituals Associated with the Drug Development Process, 52
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 155, 157 (1997) (explaining how surrogate markers affect the tradeoff
between safety and drug availability). This process has accelerated the number of drug
approvals and, consequently, benefited patients who suffer from the AIDS virus as well as
some cancers. See Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropri-
ate Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L.
REv. 93, 115 (1999) (citing the fast-track approval of the protease inhibitor ritonavir,
which took approximately 10 weeks after the NDA application date).
58. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (1999).
59. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
115, § 112, 111 Stat. 2296, 2309-10 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356 (Supp. III 1997)).
60. Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 379g-h (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
61. PDUFA created a fee schedule based on the amount of FDA resources required
to review various types of marketing applications, and it provided for inflation-based in-
creases in the fees throughout the five-year period in which the fee system was initially in
effect. See 21 U.S.C. § 379h (Supp. III 1997). In the first five years, the FDA expected to
receive over $325 million in user fees. See John Henkel, User Fees to Fund Faster Reviews,
FDA CONSUMER, Oct. 1993, at 19, 19-20.
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proceeds on hiring and training new personnel to participate in the NDA
review process." They also informally promised to reduce significantly
the NDA processing time. 3 In fact, the FDA has employed more than
240 new reviewers and completes reviews of standard NDAs within
twelve months.6' Interestingly, the statute prevents the FDA from di-
verting any of these user fees to handle the increasing load of post-
approval reports generated by this accelerated pace of NDA review.65
Adding to these concerns, the Food and Drug Administration Moderni-
zation Act of 1997 (FDAMA),66 which reauthorized PDUFA, relaxed the
"substantial evidence" standard.67 NDA sponsors can now submit one
instead of two adequate and well-controlled clinical trials.68 This may
translate into the enrollment of fewer total patients as subjects. Thus,
these pre-approval studies may become even less likely to uncover low
62. The agreement to direct the user fee proceeds toward accelerating the new drug
approval process represented a hard-fought compromise between the FDA and the phar-
maceutical industry. At first, the industry opposed user fees, and the agency feared that a
fee arrangement would make it "beholden" to the industry. Eventually, the FDA and the
industry supported the user fee scheme on the condition that the proceeds supplement
existing agency resources for NDA reviews. See Bruce N. Kuhlik, Industry Funding of
Improvements to the FDA's New Drug Approval Process: The Prescription Drug User Fee
Act of 1992, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 483, 485 n.12, 486-91 (1992) (describing the history of
the user fee proposals).
63. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 1795. Since the enactment of PDUFA, the average
time from submission to approval of new drug applications has dropped from approxi-
mately 30 months to 12 months. See RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at
17.
64. See Merrill, supra note 29, at 1840. With PDUFA in place, the FDA now ap-
proves 40% more new drugs each year, an increase from an average of 70 to 97 approvals
annually. See RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 17. Although the user
fee amendments expired in October 1997, Congress extended the fee system for five more
years. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
§ 103(a)(1), 111 Stat. 2296, 2299-2304 (1997).
65. See 21 U.S.C. § 379h(g)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1997); see also Kuhlik, supra note 62, at
499-500.
66. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
67. See id. § 115(a), 111 Stat. at 2313 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (Supp. III 1997);
see also Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the "Gold Standard" for New Drug Ap-
proval? Redefining "Substantial Evidence" in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997,
54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 127, 146 (1999) (noting that section 115 of FDAMA uses permis-
sive rather than presumptive or mandatory language to revise the standard, and stating
that pharmaceutical manufacturers may establish substantial evidence of effectiveness
with data from one adequate and well-controlled clinical study if the FDA determines that
such data are sufficient).
68. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (Supp. III 1997) ("If the Secretary determines, based on
relevant science, that the data from one adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation
and confirmatory evidence (obtained prior to or after such investigation) are sufficient to
establish effectiveness, the Secretary may consider such data and evidence to constitute
substantial evidence ....").
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frequency or longer latency ADRs.
For years, critics blamed the FDA's lengthy pre-approval process for
creating a "drug lag" that delayed drugs approved in Europe from
reaching the American market." This lag in approval time, however,
created an unintended safety benefit because applicants must provide
any available foreign marketing data with a NDA.0 Consequently, the
agency received a greater quantum of data on which to base its review,
rather than relying solely on pre-approval clinical trials.7 In the case of
thalidomide, at least, the "lag" meant that the drug's terrible side effects
became apparent prior to approval for marketing in the United States.2
The speedier review system has the benefit of making innovative new
drugs available to the consumer more quickly,73 but it may increase the
odds that the NDA process will fail to detect dangers associated with
new drugs.74 In general, the FDA has not relaxed its standards for proof
of safety and effectiveness, except in the limited fashion described above.
In fact, the FDA has asserted that, since implementation of PDUFA and
the accompanying acceleration of the NDA approval process, the rate of
serious, unanticipated ADRs has actually decreased. 75 The debate over
69. See William M. Wardell, A Close Inspection of the "Calm Look": Rhetorical Am-
blyopia and Selective Amnesia at the Food and Drug Administration, 239 JAMA 2004,
2004-05 (1978) (criticizing the FDA's position on the drug lag and parodying the Commis-
sioner's position as follows: "The drug lag does not exist; nevertheless I will abolish it");
see also Kenneth I. Kaitin et al., The Drug Lag: An Update of New Drug Introductions in
the United States and in the United Kingdom, 1977 Through 1987, 46 CLIN.
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 121,133 (1989).
70. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(ii) (1999).
71. According to one FDA expert, the number of new drugs marketed first in the
United States (rather than in a foreign market) has risen from approximately 3% in the
early 1980s to 60% in 1998. See Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 1732.
72. See PETER BARTON HuTr & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW
478, 582 (2d ed. 1991) (describing the Thalidomide tragedy); Morton Mintz, The Cure That
Could Kill You; FDA Reforms Are Bad Medicine, WASH. POST, July 14, 1996, at Cl (de-
scribing how the FDA's delay in approving Thalidomide for use in the United States pre-
vented thousands of profound birth defects). But cf. Wardell, supra note 69, at 2005 (de-
scribing and criticizing another commentator's claim that the "drug lag" benefits and
protects patients).
73. See Salbu, supra note 57, at 119-20 (noting FDA claims that PDUFA has enabled
the agency to "reduce to 15 months the 30-month average time ... [previously] required
for a drug review").
74. See Schwartz, supra note 49, at Al (describing consumer advocates' concerns that
the FDA "has become too cozy with the pharmaceutical industry and too lax," and dis-
cussing experts' concerns that increasing approval rates might mean that "more problems
are bound to make it onto the market").
75. See RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 35. The FDA com-
pared data from a 1990 GAO report that tracked serious adverse reactions during the
postmarketing period for drugs that were approved between 1976 and 1985. The GAO
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the tradeoff between lengthy scrutiny of NDAs and the consequent delay
in market availability is not a new one,76 but these recent statutory
changes increase the frequency with which new drugs reach the market
after shorter review periods, and with lower levels of foreign marketing
data or reduced data from clinical trials.
A number of FDA employees involved with the NDA process have
recognized the gravity of the hazard that these changes to the approval
process pose, as well as the weaknesses inherent in the traditional model
for evaluating new drugs. In a few cases, particular reviewers have vo-
cally opposed approvals that later came back to haunt the agency." In
fact, several scientists have chosen to leave the FDA rather than con-
tinue to participate in what they regard as a sloppy approval process.78
This intra-agency dissension reflects the broader conflict between con-
cerns about drug safety and drug availability that have always existed and
will probably never fully be resolved. The FDA has, however, recently
paid renewed attention to the back end of the approval process. They
have begun to work towards creating new systems to manage the risks
associated with drug products at various stages of development and mar-
keting.79
B. Post-approval Requirements
The FDA has created a system of mandatory manufacturer ADR re-
porting, coupled with voluntary health care professional reporting, to
monitor the safety of new prescription drug products once they enter the
market. The agency's post-approval risk monitoring programs attempt
defined "serious," for purposes of the report, as adverse reactions that resulted in: (1)
withdrawal of the drug; (2) new warnings; (3) significant labeling changes; or (4) issuance
of a "Dear Healthcare Professional" letter to inform physicians about important new drug
safety information and labeling changes. The FDA took similar data for drugs approved
under PDUFA during a narrower time period (1994-1997) and concluded that the incen-
tives created by PDUFA did not cause any increase in drug withdrawals or serious adverse
reactions. See id. at 34-36, app. A. Although there may be methodological flaws associ-
ated with the comparison between these two data sets, the FDA appears confident that
PDUFA-related acceleration of the NDA approval process has not caused serious safety
problems. The agency acknowledges, however, that 30% of new drugs required significant
postmarket label changes, which "still raises the question of why these serious risks are not
discovered before marketing." Id. at 36.
76. See HuTr & MERRILL, supra note 72, at 580-83 (describing this risk-tradeoff de-
bate in the context of the Drug Amendments of 1962).
77. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 49, at A8 (describing the FDA lead reviewer's op-
position to approval of Rezulin, the agency's decision to remove the reviewer from the
committee, and the subsequent safety problems with the drug once it entered the market).
78. See Grady, supra note 3, at A21.
79. See RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 77-82.
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to: (1) detect previously unknown adverse reactions associated with a
drug product; (2) evaluate in more detail the product's known risks;
(3) uncover adverse reactions that arise from product interactions; (4)
uncover adverse reactions peculiar to particular segments of the patient
population; and (5) attempt to identify causal connections between mar-
keted drug products and patient problems. 8° The FDA enters informa-
tion gathered from mandatory and voluntary reporting into a database,
and a "postmarketing safety evaluator" processes the information.81
Based on the apparent gravity of the risk, the FDA may issue a medical
alert to health professionals, require labeling changes to reflect new in-
formation, require boxed warnings in labeling to emphasize particularly
important warnings, or require that the product be withdrawn from the
market altogether.2
Given the enormous potential risks posed by new prescription drugs,
existing systems for the post-approval surveillance of pharmaceutical
products deserve close scrutiny. In contrast to the FDA, which allocates
very limited resources to the task of post-approval monitoring,83 many
foreign drug approval systems provide significant resources for detecting
problems with drugs during the post-approval stage, in recognition of the
fact that it often takes widespread use to uncover serious, but less com-
mon, problems associated with drug products.w Recently, however, the
80. See id. at 52.
81. See John Henkel, MedWatch: FDA's "Heads Up" on Medical Product Safety,
FDA CONSUMER, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 11, 15.
82. See id. at 15 (describing various examples, including the withdrawal of Redux and
Pondimin from the market).
83. See RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 30 ("The majority of
FDA program resources are devoted to premarketing scientific risk identification and as-
sessment and approval or nonapproval. Significant, but substantially fewer, resources are
devoted to postmarketing surveillance and risk assessment activities."). One commentator
has suggested that the FDA's decision to reduce resource-intensive activities, such as in-
spections of pharmaceutical company facilities, results from the increasing number of
ADR reports that the agency now receives. Such reports may allow the FDA to utilize its
enforcement resources more efficiently. See Mary Olson, Substitution in Regulatory Agen-
cies: FDA Enforcement Alternatives, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 404 (1996).
84. See, e.g., Harvey Teff, Drug Approval in England and the United States, 33 AM. J.
COMP. L. 567, 579 (1985) (describing the "fundamental difference of regulatory philoso-
phy" between the United States and England). The United Kingdom places a heavier
emphasis on monitoring post-approval adverse reactions. See id. The U.K. "has more
readily accommodated to the unpalatable truth that ... serious, rare side effects will not
necessarily manifest themselves until a drug has been used by a far greater proportion of
the population than is feasible even with extensive premarket testing." Id; see also
Evelyne Friedel & Michael Freundlich, European Community Harmonization of the Li-
censing and Manufacturing of Medicinal Products, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 141, 168-70
(1994) (describing the pharmacovigilance system used by member states of the EC under
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FDA has recognized the importance of modernizing the system, in terms
of both the scope and coordination of information collection and analy-
sis." The new Commissioner recently testified at a congressional appro-
priations hearing about the need for an "integrated system for the re-
porting, monitoring, and evaluation of all FDA regulated product-related
injuries. '
1. Regulatory Requirements
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act requires the holder of an NDA to
report any data relating to clinical experiences with the drug that the
FDA decides to require by regulation.Y The FDA has only gradually
taken up this congressional data collection assignment. It initially prom-
ulgated implementing regulations in 1963 to require that companies
maintain records and submit annual reports concerning information or
developments not previously submitted as part of the NDA or not previ-
ously encountered during clinical trials of the drug." Unless the informa-
tion suggested an "unexpected" adverse drug experience, which had to
be reported to the FDA on an expedited basis, periodic reports only had
to include information from clinical and nonclinical experience and
the guidance of the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products, and noting that the
CPMP is developing procedures to require physicians to report serious unanticipated ad-
verse reactions). The rate of spontaneous reporting in the United States compares unfa-
vorably with that of other countries. The U.S. rate averages about 25% of the rate in
Denmark, 40% of the rate in Canada, and half of the reporting rate in the United King-
dom. See Stanley A. Edlavitch, Adverse Drug Event Reporting: Improving the Low U.S.
Reporting Rates, 148 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1499, 1499 (1988). There are impor-
tant distinctions between regulatory systems that emphasize premarket screening and
those that focus on standard-setting enforced through after-the-fact policing. See Peter
Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1033-37 (1983).
85. See CDER REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 13, at 23, 30-32.
86. FDA to Release Study on How to Better Assess Safety, Efficacy of Drugs, Devices,
8 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 725 (May 6, 1999) (quoting Commissioner Jane Henney's con-
gressional testimony).
87. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(1) (1994).
88. See 21 C.F.R. § 130.13 (1968). The original regulation required maintenance of
the following records:
[C]linical experience, studies, investigations, and tests conducted by the applicant
or reported to him by any person, including the drug that is the subject of the ap-
plication and related drugs, and reports in the scientific literature involving the
drug that is the subject of the application. (The applicant must identify at the
time of each report submission each drug he considers related to the subject
drug.)
Id. § 130.13(a)(1). Manufacturers of drugs subject to an approved NDA were required to
report adverse drug experiences to the FDA beginning, with certain exceptions, in 1963.
See 29 Fed. Reg. 7019, 7020 (1964); 28 Fed. Reg. 6381, 6381-82 (1963); see also Stanton v.




studies received or obtained by the applicant during that reporting inter-
val."
Because of regulatory ambiguity and disappointing results, the FDA
substantially revised its original reporting regulations in 1985.9 For
drugs marketed under an approved NDA, the rules require that manu-
facturers submit several types of reports. The regulations do not require
manufacturers actively to seek out safety information about their prod-
ucts. Instead, the current regulations require manufacturers to submit
adverse experience reports whenever a health care professional or con-
sumer spontaneously notifies it of "[any adverse event associated with
the use of a drug in humans, whether or not considered drug-related."9'
Thus the "mandatory" system is only as effective as the degree of volun-
tary participation permits?9 Even if pharmaceutical manufacturers com-
ply fully with mandatory ADR reporting requirements, these reports
represent only the proverbial tip of the iceberg of drug reactions and in-
teractions. Manufacturers only submit reports of adverse events based
on what physicians send to them,93 and these reports comprise only asmall fraction of the total number of adverse drug reactions that occur.?4
89. See 21 C.F.R. § 130.13(b)(3)(iii) (1967) (later redesignated as 21 C.F.R.
§ 130.13(b)(4)(iv) (1968)). These requirements applied only to drugs approved on or after
June 20, 1963, and the FDA subsequently promulgated a separate regulation extending
these requirements to drugs that it had approved before that date. See 21 C.F.R. § 130.35
(1968).
90. See New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (1985).
91. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1999); see also New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed.
Reg. at 7471 (noting that the ADR system was created as a mechanism to warn the FDA
and health care professionals about significant safety problems associated with prescrip-
tion drugs).
92. Spontaneous, or unsolicited, reports include all reports from manufacturers or
health care professionals (as well as consumers) but do not include reports arising from
formal clinical studies. See Gerald A. Faich, Adverse Drug-Reaction Monitoring, 314 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1589, 1589-90 (1986).
93. Drug manufacturers may also become aware of ADRs through less formal con-
tacts with health care providers. See Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent Can
the FDA Regulate the Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives?,
47 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 309, 314-15 (1992) (recognizing that members of a sales force "can
provide an early warning system for adverse drug reactions or less serious practical diffi-
culties encountered by physicians that might otherwise not come to the company's atten-
tion as quickly").
94. The full extent of underreporting of adverse reactions remains unknown, but sev-
eral estimates suggest that the underreporting problem is enormous. One U.S. study esti-
mated that physicians report less than one percent of serious ADRs to the FDA. See H.D.
Scott et al., Rhode Island Physicians' Recognition and Reporting of Adverse Drug Reac-
tions, 70 R.I. MED. J. 311, 311-16 (1987). In Britain, the estimates suggest that no more
than 10% of serious ADRs and 2%-4% of non-serious ADRs are processed through the
spontaneous reporting system there. See CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND
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Because the spontaneous reporting numerator represents only a tiny
fraction of the actual number of ADRs, it remains difficult to estimate
accurately the incidence of safety problems with many prescription
drugs."
The agency now defines an "adverse drug experience" as "any adverse
event associated with the use of a drug in humans, whether or not con-
sidered drug related." The speed with which a manufacturer must file
reports depends on whether the adverse event is "unexpected," a term
that has remained definitionally stable over time, but that has engen-
dered some confusion. Within fifteen days, manufacturers must submit
reports of all adverse drug experiences that are both "serious" and "un-
expected"' and they must "promptly investigate" all such adverse expe-
riences.98
By contrast, manufacturers need only submit periodic reports for non-
serious or expected adverse events. 99 The periodic reports must contain
RESEARCH, FDA, THE CLINICAL IMPACT OF ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING 5 (1996),
available in <http://www.fda.gov/medwatch>; see also B.L. Strom & P. Tugwell, Pharma-
coepidemiology: Current Status, Prospects, and Problems, 113 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MED. 179, 179-81 (1990). The reporting rates for medical devices appear to be equally
low. See UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-87-1, MEDICAL
DEVICES: EARLY WARNING OF PROBLEMS IS HAMPERED BY SEVERE
UNDERREPORTING 3 (1986) (finding that less than one percent of adverse events associ-
ated with the use of medical devices in hospitals were reported to the FDA and that more
serious events were less likely to be reported).
95. To further complicate the drug safety picture, the FDA lacks useful data about
the numbers of patients who take particular drugs as well as about length and degree of
exposure to these drugs. These data are necessary to determine the denominator for pur-
poses of calculating the incidence of drug safety problems. See CENTER FOR DRUG
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, supra note 94, at 5.
96. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) (1999).
97. The regulations define the term "[s]erious adverse drug experience" as:
Any adverse drug experience occurring at any dose that results in any of the fol-
lowing outcomes: Death, a life-threatening adverse drug experience, inpatient
hospitalization or prolongation of existing hospitalization, a persistent or signifi-
cant disability/incapacity, or a congenital anomaly/birth defect. Important medi-
cal events that may not result in death, be life-threatening, or require serious
hospitalization may be considered a serious adverse drug experience when, based
upon appropriate medical judgment, they may jeopardize the patient or subject
and may require medical or surgical intervention to prevent one of the outcomes
listed in this definition.
Id. The regulations define an "unexpected adverse drug experience" as "[a]ny adverse
drug experience that is not listed in the current labeling for the drug product. This in-
cludes events that may be symptomatically and pathophysiologically related to an event
listed in the labeling, but differ from the event because of greater severity or specificity."
Id.
98. See id. § 314.80(c)(1)(i)-(ii).
99. Until recently, the FDA required NDA holders to submit periodic reports of the
frequency of ADRs associated with their products, as well as reports within 15 working
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summaries of all fifteen-day reports, along with reports of other adverse
experiences, and explanations of any action that the manufacturer has
taken in response to reported information.'0° The regulations also re-
quire that holders of an approved NDA submit quarterly adverse drug
experience reports for the first three years of marketing and annual re-
ports afterwards.' The initial close scrutiny during the first three years
of a drug's marketing reflects an understanding that, during this time pe-
riod, physicians are less familiar with the product and its known side ef-
fects. It also reflects the reality that the drug's safety profile will con-
tinue to develop as more patients take the product. Some industry
insiders refer to this early marketing period as "the red zone." Finally,
additional regulations for new drugs require that manufacturers submit a
brief summary of new information accumulated during the preceding
year that "might affect the safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the drug
product" along with a description of the manufacturer's intended re-
sponse to this information.' °
Recently, the FDA redefined some of the other regulatory terms that
previously caused confusion. For example, the agency has gradually nar-
rowed and clarified the definition of "serious," thereby shrinking the
subset of all adverse drug events about which manufacturers must pro-
vide information.03 The vagueness of certain terms used in the definition
of "serious," such as "disability" and "life-threatening," has, however, led
days of "any significant increase in frequency" of ADRs. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(1)(ii),
(2) (1996). Effective June 29, 1992, the FDA also required reports of any significant in-
creases in "therapeutic failure (lack of effect)" detected by a manufacturer. See
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(1)(ii) (1996). The FDA recently revoked the increased frequency
reporting requirement, stating that it had not generated additional useful information on
which the agency could base post-approval safety decisions. See Postmarketing Expedited
Adverse Experience Reporting for Human Drug and Licensed Biological Products; In-
creased Frequency Reports, 62 Fed. Reg. 34,166 (1997). At the same time, the FDA also
eliminated the reporting requirement for increases in therapeutic failures. See id. at
34,168.
100. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(2)(ii) (1999).
101. See id. § 314.80(c)(2)(i). In addition, the FDA may require the continued submis-
sion of quarterly reports after the three year period has expired if deemed appropriate.
See id. Finally, the regulations for drugs with an approved NDA demand more detailed
information in the periodic reports than the regulations governing reports for drugs mar-
keted without an approved NDA. Compare id. § 314.80(c)(2)(ii), with id. § 310.305(c).
102. See id. § 314.81(b)(2)(i). The regulations also require the annual submission of
distribution data for approved new drugs. See id. § 314.81(b)(2)(ii).
103. For example, one previous definition of "serious" included a reference to adverse
reactions "requir[ing] prescription drug therapy." See New Drug and Antibiotic Regula-
tions, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7500 (1985). The subsequent deletion of this component of the
definition may have reduced confusion because, although many serious reactions un-
doubtedly require prescription drug treatment, non-serious reactions may require such
treatment as well.
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to some disagreements between manufacturers and the FDA about the
reach of the fifteen-day reporting requirements."°
The FDA also has issued guidelines to clarify further the meaning of
several important terms relating to post-approval reporting, though ulti-
mately these guidelines may not have accomplished this goal. For exam-
ple, in 1995, the agency released a guideline applicable to reporting re-
quirements for drugs subject to an approved NDA. This document
elaborates on scenarios outside the definition of "serious" that might still
trigger expedited reporting. 5 More recently, the FDA issued a guideline
that specifically listed four elements that an NDA holder should obtain
before reporting an adverse event relating to a drug: (1) an identifiable
patient; (2) an identifiable reporter; (3) a suspect drug product; and (4)
an adverse event or fatal outcome. 10' Interestingly, in another apparent
104. In 1997, the agency issued a final rule that, among other things, defined previ-
ously undefined terms in the regulations and clarified the definitions of other previously
defined terms. See 62 Fed. Reg. 52,237, 52,249-51 (1997) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.305,
314.80 (1999)). For example, the term "disability" (as used in 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.305(b) &
314.80(a)) is now defined to mean "a substantial disruption of a person's ability to conduct
normal life functions." The term "life-threatening" (as used in 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.305(b) &
314.80(a)) is now defined as "any adverse drug experience that places the patient, in the
view of the initial reporter, at immediate risk of death from the adverse drug experience as
it occurred."
105. See FDA, CLINICAL SAFETY DATA MANAGEMENT: DEFINITIONS AND
STANDARDS FOR EXPEDITED REPORTING 5 (1995), available in <http://www.fda.gov>.
The FDA notes that "medical and scientific judgment should be exercised in deciding
whether expedited reporting is appropriate in other situations." Id. These other situa-
tions include "important medical events that may not be immediately life-threatening or
result in death or hospitalization but may jeopardize the patient or may require interven-
tion to prevent one of the other outcomes listed in the definition .... These should also
usually be considered serious." Id. Such amendatory interpretations of previously-issued
regulations illustrate the continued problem with definitional instability. Other commen-
tators have also noted that spontaneous reporting systems must have clearly stated objec-
tives in order to function well, and they have pointed out the confusion created by incon-
sistent regulatory definitions. See, e.g., Edlavitch, supra note 84, at 1500 (describing
inconsistencies between the 1985 regulatory definition of "serious" and a variety of inter-
pretations of that term in government guidance documents and medical journal articles).
The FDA also issued a previous guideline, applicable to both new approved drugs and
drugs not subject to approved NDAs, in 1992. See Guideline for Postmarketing Reporting
of Adverse Drug Experiences; Availability, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,437 (1992). Such guidelines
do not, however, bind regulated entities or the agency. See Lars Noah, The FDA's New
Policy on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113, 116-
18 (1997) (describing the agency's attempt to differentiate between binding and non-
binding statements of regulatory policy).
106. See generally FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, POSTMARKETING ADVERSE
EXPERIENCE REPORTING FOR HUMAN DRUGS AND LICENSED BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS:
CLARIFICATION OF WHAT TO REPORT (1997), available in <http://www.fda.gov/cder/
guidance.htm> (strongly discouraging manufacturers from submitting reports if any of the
four elements of information is unavailable).
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attempt to reduce the number of reports of non-serious, labeled reac-
tions, the FDA now discourages submission of adverse event information
obtained by manufacturers during the course of sponsored patient sup-
port or disease management programs.'O° The agency clearly continues to
struggle with the volume of reports received and appears to be an-
nouncing its regulatory priorities to manufacturers in order to reduce the
flow of lower-priority ADR reports. As the FDA refines its definition of
the class of events that it wants reported in order to focus its resources on
the most serious events, however, there may be some increased risk of
missing important early warning reports at the fringes.
Even more importantly, the obligation to file ADR reports, in theory,
does not depend on a causality assessment. The FDA's regulations make
it clear that manufacturers should not report only those adverse events
"caused" by their drug; a suspected association will suffice. However,
the FDA's guidance on the causation assessment may create more confu-
sion than illumination.' One of the most problematic aspects of both
the required reporting system and the voluntary MedWatch system'°9 is
the process of determining whether a particular symptom or effect arises
from the patient's medication, from the underlying disease, or from some
other, extraneous cause, such as diet or alcohol intake."' When the FDA
states that no proof of causation is needed to trigger the obligation to re-
107. See id. (noting that such information should be treated like other safety informa-
tion obtained from postmarketing studies, unless the adverse events in question would
trigger a 15 day report). The FDA also now encourages NDA holders to request agency
permission to waive the requirement for submitting reports of "nonserious and labeled"
adverse events. See id.
108. See, e.g., Revision of Rules Governing Postmarketing Reporting of Adverse Drug
Reactions, 51 Fed. Reg. 47,028, 47,030 (1986) (explaining that, in spontaneous post-
approval reporting, "the reporter presumably exercises discretion in deciding whether to
report, withholding reports of events that seem obviously not to be caused by the drug,"
which suggests that the FDA assumes manufacturers will and should make some sort of
causality assessment).
109. See infra Part I.B.2.
110. Patients taking prescription medications may recognize that they are experiencing
an unpleasant or painful symptom (such as dizziness, racing of the heart, headache, or
nausea); these patients may, however, attribute such symptoms to their disease. Not real-
izing that their symptoms arise from their medication, these patients may not report the
symptoms to their physicians. See Grady, supra note 3, at A21. In the context of securities
litigation, some courts have appreciated the complexity of the causation questions sur-
rounding adverse drug reactions. See, e.g., In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d
153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that only when reports of adverse effects "provide statisti-
cally significant evidence that the ill effects may be caused by-rather than randomly asso-
ciated with-use of the drug" must pharmaceutical companies disclose the information in
securities filings; anecdotal or isolated reports of adverse effects need not be included in
filings); see also Ellen L. Rosen, Drug Co. Ads Can Be Basis for 10(b) Suit, NAT'L L.J.,
July 27, 1998, at B1.
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port, in effect, the agency assumes that health professionals have already
made a rough assessment of causality. In other words, the FDA assumes
it is likely that the physician concluded that the drug in question may
have caused the patient's problem because the physician would not oth-
erwise have reported the suspected adverse reaction to the manufacturer
or the FDA.1 ' Thus, the ambiguity surrounding both the causality as-
sessment and the circumstances triggering the fifteen-day reporting re-
quirement leave room for interpretation on the part of the reporter. Re-
cent amendments and guidelines attempting to clarify the regulations
represent only a partial response to the definitional problems that the
ADR reporting regulations pose.
Other reasons also account for the FDA's position that causality as-
sessments do not factor into ADR requirements. Manufacturers have an
incentive to underestimate the likelihood of a causal relationship be-
tween their products and patient ADRs. Premature assessments of cau-
sality (or lack of causality) can, however, potentially distort the statistics
relating to how frequently the ADR occurs in the patient population us-
ing the drug. Further complicating the causation question, some adverse
reactions occur at just slightly above the background rate (the rate at
which a condition manifests itself in a given population without exposure
to the drug in question) in the treated population." Because frequency
analysis contributes to a population-wide causality assessment, it is im-
portant not to discard suspected individual ADRs prematurely.
Moreover, pharmaceutical manufacturers sometimes have incentives
to repackage adverse drug event information for the FDA's consump-
tion. Concerns about market competition and liability may affect the
manner in which manufacturers present drug-related data to the agency.
For instance, in drug products liability litigation, plaintiffs may pursue
negligence per se claims by alleging non-compliance with ADR reporting
111. The physician who initially reports to the manufacturer need not resolve the cau-
sation question; indeed, this question frequently remains unresolvable for a single patient.
See Henkel, supra note 81, at 12 (noting that the FDA emphasizes that it is "not necessary
to prove that a medical product caused an adverse reaction-a suspected association is suf-
ficient reason to make a report"); see also FDA, Clinical Therapeutics and the Recognition
of Drug-Induced Disease (1995), available in <http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/articles/dig/
recognit.htm#>. The FDA describes a six-step process for assessing a possible drug-
related event, including verification of the interval between the beginning of drug treat-
ment and the onset of the adverse reaction, dechallenging (i.e. stopping the drug therapy
to look for improvement in the patient's symptoms) and rechallenging (i.e. restarting the
drug therapy, if appropriate) and monitoring the patient to determine whether the adverse
reaction recurs.
112. See RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 44.
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requirements."' Because the FDA's reporting requirements traditionally
have suffered from ambiguities, litigants could always find a way to argue
that manufacturers had violated the regulations. Invariably, no matter
how conscientious the behavior of the manufacturer, an ADR or pub-
lished study will slip though the cracks. The fear of negligence per se
claims may, therefore, encourage defensive manufacturers to err on the
side of over-reporting ADRs. This, in turn, interferes with the efficiency
and efficacy of the post-approval surveillance regulatory system.
Nonetheless, a number of disincentives to spontaneous reporting of
adverse drug events may provide a counterweight to the incentives cre-
ated by the fear of tort liability."4 At one level, pharmaceutical manufac-
turers would prefer to ignore red flags signaling problems with a product
in order to keep the product on the market."' They will resist filing
ADR reports that appear to concede that their product caused a par-
ticular injury."6 The FDA reporting regulations contain a disclaimer for
manufacturers that states that the submission of required reports does
not constitute an admission or conclusion by the manufacturer or the
113. See, e.g., Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 558 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the manufacturer's failure to
file annual reports concerning adverse drug reactions with the FDA was negligence per
se); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 409 (Ct. App. 1967) (rejecting a
drug manufacturer's argument that there is a "difference between violation of the labeling
and marketing provisions and violation of the reporting provisions, because the labeling
provisions of the statute are designed to protect the public, whereas the reporting provi-
sions of the statute are concerned merely with raw data comprehensible only to scientists
in the FDA"); Carnoto v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 95-9076 (Apr. 14, 1999)
(finding that Sandoz "ignore[d], suppress[ed], and/or underreport[ed] adverse reaction
reports" concerning Parlodel, a lactation suppressant, and awarding punitive damages to
the plaintiff); see also Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1379 (4th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the defendant's withholding of adverse reaction reports over a period of
eight years justified awarding punitive damages).
114. See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the
Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 499 (1997) ("The marketing and profit in-
centives for a pharmaceutical manufacturer are contrary to thorough and accurate gath-
ering and reporting of ADRs."); Morton Mintz, The Cure That Could Kill You: FDA Re-
forms Are Bad Medicine, WASH. POST, July 14, 1996, at C1 (reporting that numerous drug
manufacturers have missed ADR reporting deadlines in recent years).
115. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES
OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 54-56 (1996).
116. See Patricia L. Andel, Inapplicability of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege to the
Drug and Medical Device Industry, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 94-95, 145 (1997) (arguing
that it is inappropriate to apply the privilege, which protects against disclosure of "self-
evaluative material," in the context of drug safety reporting when the public's need to
know is outweighed by the public interest in confidentiality, and that the privilege is un-
necessary in this context because the drug industry has other "strong incentives to investi-
gate thoroughly.., the safety and effectiveness of its products" in order to avoid products
liability exposure).
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agency that the drug in question caused the adverse reaction."7 Nothing
prevents the admission of such reports at trials, however, so manufactur-
ers may take little comfort in the disclaimer."
At this level, the process of detecting and compiling information about
adverse drug events among very sick patients taking multiple drugs rep-
resents a far more complex problem than that posed by the venal drug
manufacturer who will do anything for a profit."9 The latter may, in cal-
culating potential costs, determine that it is most cost effective to re-
spond quickly to fairly obvious patterns of adverse reactions associated
with a marketed product rather than face a massive class action lawsuit at
some point in the future. Already, the withdrawn diet drugs have gener-
ated numerous suits, and entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers anxiously
await the next prescription drug debacle.' The tort system, however, is
not an adequate substitute for a rigorous reporting and monitoring sys-
tem, when the goal is to detect subtler problems of drug reactions or in-
teractions in large groups of patients who may have multiple or serious
117. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(k) (1999) (noting that "[a] report or information submitted
by an applicant under this section ... does not necessarily reflect a conclusion by the ap-
plicant or FDA that ... the drug caused or contributed to an adverse effect," and that
"[ain applicant need not admit, and may deny, that the report ... constitutes an admission
that the drug caused or contributed to an adverse effect").
118. With regard to the effect of these reports on the outcome of litigation, the FDA
has commented that, "although the FDA does not intend for such a report to be viewed as
an admission of liability, whether a court will treat a submission to FDA as an admission
will depend on factors outside of the agency's control, such as the contents of the report
itself." New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7476 (1985).
119. Manufacturers have certainly, however, attempted to manipulate the require-
ments of the ADR reporting system to protect profits or to avoid responsibility for safety
problems associated with a prescription drug. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 115, at 129
(describing a situation in which a drug manufacturer encouraged physicians who called to
report birth defects associated with maternal use of an anti-nausea drug to describe those
contacts as "inquiries" rather than "reports" in order to avoid having to forward the in-
formation to the FDA); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Prod-
ucts, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1335, 1348-52 (1993) (cataloging nearly a dozen instances of ap-
parent withholding of relevant information by drug and device manufacturers during the
pre-approval or post-approval stages); see also Laura Johannes & Robert Langreth, Mar-
keter of Redux Mulling Settlement, Sees Plaintiffs' Hand, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1999, at Al
(describing testimony in the class action suit about the manufacturer's instructions to em-
ployees to delay processing of reports of heart valve defects associated with Redux); Drug
Maker Pleads Guilty Over Lethal Side Effects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1984, at A23 (de-
scribing a manufacturer's failure to report ADRs appropriately and the hundreds of seri-
ous ADRs that occurred as a result); Philip Shenon, Lily Pleads Guilty to Oraflex Charges,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1985, at A16 (describing a manufacturer's failure to report ADRs
and the criminal sanctions imposed on the manufacturer).
120. See Bob Van Voris, A Drug Maker's Legal Migraine, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1999, at
B20 (describing a class action lawsuit alleging that fen-phen's manufacturer concealed evi-
dence that the drugs can cause pulmonary hypertension and heart valve problems).
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health problems.
2. The MedWatch System
Health care providers have an ethical, though not legal, obligation to
identify and report adverse drug reactions to the FDA.' The American
Medical Association (AMA) has emphasized the importance of contin-
ued physician participation in the ADR reporting system, noting that the
FDA pays particular attention to reports received directly from physi-
cians (as opposed to reports from patients).22  Because a substantial
number of physician reports concern serious reactions resulting in hospi-
talization or death, these voluntary physician reports tend to generate the
highest proportion of drug labeling changes. 23 The FDA has gone so far
as to assert that, once new drugs are cleared for marketing, "ensuring
safety is principally the responsibility of healthcare providers and pa-
tients, who make risk decisions on an individual, rather than a popula-
tion, basis.' '124 Although physicians certainly make prescribing decisions
based on the individual needs of their patients, the FDA continues to re-
121. See AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, Principles of Medical Ethics: Principle V, in
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFS., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT
OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS (1999) [hereinafter CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS] ("A
physician shall continue to study, apply and advance scientific knowledge, make relevant
information available to patients, colleagues, and the public."). There are only two excep-
tions to the voluntary reporting scheme. The first is for vaccine-related injuries. See
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14, -25 (1994) (requiring reporting of all vaccine-related injuries). The
second applies to adverse events associated with medical devices that cause serious injury
or death. See 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b)-(c)(1) (1994) (requiring that device user facilities such as
hospitals submit reports in such cases, but exempting individual health care providers).
122. See American Med. Ass'n, supra note 38, at 362. A recent opinion from the
AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs clearly states the physician's ethical obliga-
tion to report suspected problems with prescription drugs:
A physician who suspects the occurrence of an adverse reaction to a drug ... has
an obligation to communicate that information to the broader medical commu-
nity (e.g., through submitting a report or letter to a medical journal or informing
the manufacturer of the suspect drug.. .). In the case of a serious adverse event,
the event should be reported to the [FDA]. Spontaneous reports of adverse
events are irreplaceable as a source of valuable information about drugs ... par-
ticularly their rare or delayed effects, as well as their safety in vulnerable patient
populations. Although premarketing and mandated postmarketing studies pro-
vide basic safeguards for the public health, they suffer from inhelent deficiencies
that limit their ability to detect rare or unexpected consequences of drug.., use.
AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, Opinion 9.032: Reporting Adverse Drug or Device Events, in
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 121; see also American Med. Ass'n, supra note 38,
at 363-65 (discussing physicians' ethical and professional obligations to participate in sys-
tems designed to detect adverse drug reactions).
123. See American Med. Ass'n, supra note 38, at 363-65.
124. RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 4.
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tain the responsibility for providing physicians with the most complete
and accurate population-based safety information on which to base their
individualized decisions.
In 1993, the FDA created a system to bypass the pharmaceutical
manufacturer and encourage direct reporting to the agency of suspected
adverse reactions. To facilitate provider reporting of suspected medical
product problems (including problems with drugs, biologics, medical de-
vices and medical foods), the FDA established the "MedWatch Medical
Products Reporting Program." '125 The MedWatch program represents the
FDA's first concerted effort to involve physicians more formally in the
post-approval drug monitoring process.'26 According to the FDA, the
program has several important goals, including clarifying what adverse
events should be reported, increasing awareness about serious adverse
drug reactions, facilitating the reporting process, and providing consum-
ers with information about product safety issues.'
27
MedWatch provides a simple, one-page form for physician use in re-
porting suspected problems with human drugs."' The system requests,
but does not require, that the reporting physician or other health profes-
sional complete a form in response to all serious adverse reactions, in-
cluding death, life-threatening reactions requiring hospitalization, dis-
ability, birth defects, miscarriage, or other reactions requiring medical
intervention to avoid permanent damage to the patient.129 The request
for reports includes "expected" ADRs. The program seeks to gather
data across a wide field of patients taking a particular drug in order to
detect patterns of adverse events.
The early returns paint a moderately favorable picture about the effec-
tiveness and quality of physician participation in the MedWatch pro-
gram. Overall, the quantity of adverse drug reaction reports to the FDA
has increased dramatically, from approximately 40,000 in 198513° to nearly
125. See David A. Kessler, Introducing MedWatch: A New Approach to Reporting
Medication and Device Adverse Effects and Product Problems, 269 JAMA 2765 (1993).
126. See id. at 2765 ("Unfortunately, many health professionals do not think to report
adverse events that might be associated with medications.., to the [FDA] or to the manu-
facturer. That needs to change, and the FDA is taking steps to encourage that to hap-
pen.").
127. See Henkel, supra note 81, at 11-12. The MedWatch program also covers
biologics, medical devices, dietary supplements, infant formulas, medical foods, and food
additives. See id.
128. See id. at 13 (reproducing a sample reporting form).
129. See id. at 11-12 (noting the existence of the separate mandatory reporting systems
for medical device manufacturers).
130. See New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7473 (1985).
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160,000 in 1996.' Health professionals submitted 58% of the total re-
ports received in 1996, though only 9% of these were reported directly to
the FDA. Although reports from health professionals have increased in
absolute numbers in recent years, the percentage of total ADR reports
received from health professionals has actually decreased, from 72% in
1993 to 58% by 1996. A recent study of trends in the reporting of seri-
ous adverse reactions confirms that, although the quality of such reports
increased after the launching of MedWatch, the overall numbers of re-
ports have decreased. 133 The FDA also has noted a curious trend in
ADR reporting-spontaneous reporting of ADRs peaks at the end of
the second year of a drug's marketing but then declines dramatically,
even though the prescribing of the drug and the ADR rates apparently
remain relatively stable.'3
The reason for decreased physician participation in the reporting sys-
tem remains unclear, though, in the era of managed care, reliance on
voluntary reporting may be increasingly unrealistic. Patients change
physicians far more frequently under managed care, and the duration of
the average physician-patient relationship has decreased substantially in
recent years. These changes negatively impact a physician's ability to be-
come familiar with a patient's overall medical condition, resulting in lost
or overlooked medical information and decreased communication be-
tween doctor and patient. Moreover, managed care cost controls exert
pressure on physicians to spend less time for each patient visit,' and to
prescribe more pharmaceutical products to manage chronic disease.136 A
spontaneous reporting system like MedWatch depends entirely on medi-
cal professionals for its effectiveness. Health care providers, however,
131. See FDA, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Annual Adverse Drug Ex-
perience Report: 1996 (last modified Oct. 30, 1997) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/dpe/
annrep96/index.htm>.
132. See id.
133. See T. Piazza-Hepp & D.L. Kennedy, Reporting of Adverse Events to MedWatch,
52 AM. J. HEALTH SYS. PHARM. 1436, 1436-39 (1995) (comparing reporting trends before
and after the June 1993 implementation of MedWatch, and finding that the proportion of
"serious" reports increased from 34% in 1992 to 49% in 1994).
134. See CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, supra note 94, at 5.
135. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Faulty Warning Labels Add to Risk in Prescription
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at A27 (describing how managed care has reduced the
amount of time doctors have to spend with their patients); see also Nancy K. Plant, The
Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Some New Medicine for an Old Ailment, 81 IOWA L. REV.
1007, 1023-32 (1996) (arguing that managed care has constrained physician practice to the
point that prescribing decisions may be less informed and therefore potentially more det-
rimental to patient safety).
136. See J.D. Kleinke & Scott Gottlieb, Is the FDA Approving Drugs Too Fast?,
317 BRIT. MED. J. 899 (1998).
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may find it increasingly difficult to detect, and therefore report, relevant
information when they are less familiar with their patients.
Conversely, structured utilization reviews undertaken by managed care
organizations (MCOs) may promote the routine collection and analysis
of ADR information. 137 MCOs may have the potential to assist in the
collection of information concerning adverse drug reactions because
these organizations have the capability of collecting and analyzing masses
of data, and they regularly perform outcomes research that demonstrates
this ability.38 Similar data collection using enhanced links with external
databases for ADRs associated with drugs that are paid for by managed
care may help to identify patterns of problems that are not apparent to
individual practitioners, no matter how well they know their patients.9
Ideally, MCOs would share this information with the FDA.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also play a
supporting role in tracking adverse events. Although the CDC's work
primarily concerns non-drug-related events such as outbreaks of food-
borne illnesses or new infectious agents, it also addresses problems re-
lating to prescription and non-prescription drugs and vaccines.'o Work-
ing in conjunction with the FDA, the CDC's evaluation of drug side ef-
fects has helped to uncover previously undetected problems associated
with marketed drug products. 4 ' For example, the CDC recently played
137. For example, in 1993, when Merck acquired Medco, a drug discount and mail-
order company, Merck stated that it planned to use Medco's data on the 33 million pa-
tients in its managed care plans to uncover patterns of medical effectiveness in order to
increase sales. See Milt Freudenheim, Merck's Big Gamble on a Merger, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 1993, at D1. Such data, including information about drug safety, might prove ex-
tremely useful in uncovering patterns of ADRs. See id.
138. See Ron Winslow, Limiting Drugs a Doctor Orders May Cost More, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 20, 1996, at B1.
139. See Woosley, supra note 39, at 187. Of course, the FDA's collection of data from
such sources will only prove useful if the medical community changes its practices in re-
sponse to new safety information. For example, one pharmacologist described a situation
in which data from six HMO databases indicated that the antihistamine drugs terfenadine
and astemizole could cause major cardiac toxicity when used in combination with certain
other drugs. The data became available in 1990, and a FDA advisory committee issued
warnings about the potential lethal interaction to physicians and pharmacists. See id.
One year later, there was no discernable change in prescribing or dispensing practices, and
only after repeated scholarly papers were published and an additional warning issued did
the prescribing rate for the dangerous combinations decrease (from an average of 5 pre-
scriptions per month to 2.3 prescriptions per month). See id.
140. See ELIZABETH W. ETHERIDGE, SENTINEL FOR HEALTH: A HISTORY OF THE
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 341-43 (1992).
141. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.314(h)(1) (1999) (requiring a warning of the association
between Reye syndrome and aspirin use in children); id. § 801.430(c) (requiring a warning
of the association between toxic shock syndrome and tampons).
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an instrumental role in discovering a causal connection between a new
vaccine for rotavirus and an unusually high incidence of bowel obstruc-
tion in infants. CDC epidemiologists, acting on reports from state health
officials, analyzed an apparent pattern of this complication among infants
in several states and used data from state health agencies and the vac-
142
cine's manufacturer to make the connection. The FDA then recom-
mended a temporary halt in the use of the vaccines, and the manufac-
turer, based on ninety-six reported cases of this adverse event, eventually
opted to withdraw the product from the market while further controlled
studies progressed. 14 Because the CDC has representatives around the
country who work in a variety of settings, including quarantine facilities
and local health offices, the organization is sometimes in a unique posi-
tion to detect and help investigate suspected problems with medical
products.' 44
3. Other Safety Monitoring Systems
The FDA has been forced to make difficult choices in allocating its re-
sources in the monitoring of other products under its regulatory jurisdic-
tion. Two contrasting examples provide some context in which to con-
sider the FDA's approach to drug safety monitoring. In comparison to
prescription drug surveillance, the FDA's approach to market surveil-
lance of medical devices generally represents a more proportionate re-
sponse to the relative risks posed by this category of products than its
approach to prescription drugs. The FDA's mechanisms for tracking ad-
verse effects associated with dietary supplements, by comparison appears
inadequate given the increasing popularity of the products and their po-
tential for harm.
A number of differences exist between the systems that regulate safety
of drugs and medical devices. For approved medical devices, the statute
until recently required structured post-marketing surveillance for certain
devices that may cause serious adverse consequences .1 5  FDAMA re-
142. See Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. in a Push to Bar Vaccine Given to Infants, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 1999, at Al; see also ETHERIDGE, supra note 140, at 73-80 (describing how
the CDC tracked cases of polio caused by the new polio vaccine in 1955).
143. See Lawrence K. Altman, Vaccine for Infant Diarrhea Is Withdrawn as Health
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1999, at A10 (noting that "[t]he developments are highly em-
barrassing to Federal health officials," and that "even before the FDA licensed the vaccine
... the CDC promoted it as a new weapon against rotavirus").
144. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, About CDC (visited Nov. 13,
1999) <http://www.cdc.gov/aboutcdc.htm> (describing the CDC's organizational structure
and general operations).
145. See 21 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994), amended by 21 U.S.C. § 3601 (Supp. III 1997) (re-
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laxed some of these reporting requirements, however, by repealing man-
datory safety surveillance for certain devices and giving the FDA discre-
tion over the decision about whether to order safety monitoring.'
46
The medical device statute also requires spontaneous reporting. A
device manufacturer must file a Medical Device Report (MDR) when-
ever it receives information that suggests that its device "may have
caused or contributed to a death or serious injury, or has malfunctioned"
in a way that might cause serious injury.47 In addition, the medical de-
vice reporting provision requires reporting from both device manufactur-
ers and certain device user facilities, such as hospitals48 Whenever a
user facility becomes aware that a device may have caused or contributed
to the death or serious injury of a patient in the facility, the user must
submit a report to the FDA within ten working days. 49 In contrast, the
ADR system requires reporting from manufacturers, but it only requests
reports from physicians who utilize the drug products for their patients.
The FDA's definition of "serious injury" in the implementing regula-
tions poses some of the same ambiguities that the corresponding defini-
tions create in the drug context. For medical devices, an injury is "seri-
ous" if it is "(i) life-threatening; (ii) results in permanent impairment of a
body function or permanent damage to body structure; or (iii) necessi-
tates medical or surgical intervention to preclude permanent impairment
of a body function or permanent damage to a body structure."'' ° These
regulations require reporting within thirty days for most situations5' and
within five days if the manufacturer becomes aware of a device-related
reportable event that "necessitates remedial action to prevent an unrea-
sonable risk of substantial harm to the public health."
5 2
quiring postmarket surveillance for any device that "is a permanent implant the failure of
which may cause serious, adverse health consequences or death .... or potentially presents
a serious risk to human health," and permitting postmarket surveillance for other devices
if such surveillance is "necessary to protect the public health or to provide safety or effec-
tiveness data for the device"). The surveillance regulations for these types of devices also
require that the manufacturer conduct the equivalent of Phase IV trials for the device. See
21 C.F.R. § 814.82(a)(2) (1999).
146. See 21 U.S.C. § 3601 (Supp. III 1997).
147. See 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
148. See id. § 360i(b) (defining user facilities as hospitals, ambulatory surgical facilities,
nursing homes, and outpatient treatment facilities, but excluding physicians' offices).
149. See id. (requiring annual summary reports of all serious or fatal adverse events).
150. 21 C.F.R. § 803.3(aa)(1) (1999).
151. See id. § 803.20(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (requiring reporting "[w]ithin 30 days of becoming
aware of information that reasonably suggests that a device has or may have contributed
to a death or serious injury").
152. The FDA may also request the submission of five-day reports. See id. § 803.53(b)
(requiring a manufacturer to submit a five-day report when it becomes aware of "a report-
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Overall, the medical device reporting requirements appear better
suited to the task of monitoring medical device safety, in large part be-
cause the FDA has the regulatory authority to require that users of high-
risk devices, as well as manufacturers of such devices, submit timely re-
ports of adverse events. Interestingly, however, the FDA had opposed
the statutory user facility reporting requirement, fearing that it would re-
ceive and have to process excessive and unreliable information.' The
FDA suggested instead that voluntary reporting from physicians would
accomplish the goal of improving medical device safety54
In contrast, dietary supplements and herbal products, which may pose
significant safety concerns, face essentially no postmarketing scrutiny.
For instance, it appears that certain dietary supplements may cause ad-
verse reactions or interactions when taken with various prescription
drugs.' At one point, the FDA treated such products as food additives
or drugs, but with the passage of the Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act (DSHEA) in 1994,156 these products now receive far less
able ... event ... from any information, including any trend analysis, [that] necessitates
remedial action to prevent an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health");
see also id. § 803.3(q) (defining "reportable event"). For an overview of early medical de-
vice reporting requirements, see Edward M. Basile, Medical Device Reporting: The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly, 42 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 83 (1987). Other agencies impose
stricter reporting requirements with shorter deadlines. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 50.20(a)
(1999) (requiring mine operators to report to the Mine Safety and Health Administration
"each accident, occupational injury, or occupational illness" occurring at a mine within 10
days of the accident or diagnosis).
153. See Edward M. Basile, The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990: Postmarket Sur-
veillance, MDR, and Other Postmarket Issues, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 165, 166 (1991)
(describing legislative history of the statute, and quoting a FDA official's statement during
hearings that user reporting requirements "would serve only to inundate the agency with
data of unmanageable quantity, dubious quality and enormous expense").
154. See id.
155. For example, the FDA recently warned consumers about a dietary supplement
that is chemically related to "GHB" (gamma hydroxybutyrate), and noted that it had been
associated with 55 adverse reactions, including some interactions with prescription drugs.
See Don't Use Dangerous GHB-Related Product, Agency Warns, FDA CONSUMER,
May/June 1999, available in <http://www.fda.gov/fdac/departs/1999/399_upd.html>. An-
other product, "herbal ecstasy," has caused death and injuries, resulting in a FDA pro-
posal to limit the content of ephedrine alkeloids in dietary supplement products. See Die-
tary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,678 (1997).
156. Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (codified as amended at scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.). For products on the market prior to 1994, the FDA can bring a court action
against any supplement that presents a "significant or unreasonable risk" of harm. See 21
U.S.C. § 342(f) (1994). The affirmative burden on the FDA to prove a product's "signifi-
cant or unreasonable risk" represents a resource-intensive task that the agency is unlikely
to undertake frequently. See Margaret Gilhooley, Herbal Remedies and Dietary Supple-
ments: The Boundaries of Drug Claims and Freedom of Choice, 49 FLA. L. REV. 663, 702
(1997).
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scrutiny. Under the terms of DSHEA, manufacturers of dietary supple-
ments need not demonstrate the safety or efficacy of their products prior
to marketing, unless the product contains a new ingredient. 117 Moreover,
the statute does not require that manufacturers report adverse reactions
associated with the products to the FDA. The agency must detect pat-
terns of problems associated with a dietary supplement based on anecdo-
tal evidence voluntarily submitted by physicians and consumers before
deciding to demand the removal of such a product from the market.'
As the popularity of dietary supplements and herbal remedies continues
to increase, 59 the potential for adverse reactions and interactions with
prescription drugs grows proportionately.
As the volume of new drugs entering the market continues to grow,
the pressure on the FDA's limited post-approval surveillance resources
will no doubt increase. The magnitude of the problems arising from un-
anticipated ADRs associated with new drugs deserves a proportionately
serious response, and the FDA and Congress should consider redesign-
ing the regulatory structure governing post-approval safety monitoring.
A discussion of alternative approaches is reserved for Part III.
II. CASE STUDIES
Many of the recently-approved drugs for which the FDA has opted to
withdraw marketing approval enjoyed phenomenal sales during their
brief periods of availability. Consumer demand for some of the newer
diet drugs, for example, predictably led to widespread prescribing for pa-
tients who did not meet the physiological criteria for which the FDA ap-
proved the drugs. Other recently withdrawn drugs appeared safe at the
time of their approval but showed an alarming tendency to interact with
other commonly prescribed drugs, causing adverse events in a significant
number of patients. Another group of drugs causes serious and perma-
nent liver damage in some patients, despite appearing relatively safe
during clinical trials. By necessity, pre-approval clinical studies are fairly
limited in scope and duration. The real test of a drug's safety and effec-
tiveness begins with the drug's widespread use in a patient population.
The following case studies describe both recalled drugs and drugs still
157. See 21 U.S.C. § 350b(c) (1994).
158. See Jane E. Brody, Dietary Supplements May Test Consumers' Health, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1998, at F7 (noting that patients are sometimes reluctant to admit to their
physicians that they take dietary supplements); see also Denise Grady, Articles Question
Safety of Dietary Supplements, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,1998, at A24.
159. See Michael Higgins, Hard to Swallow, A.B.A. J., June 1999, at 60, 60-62 (noting
that sales of dietary supplements reached $12 billion in 1997, up 30% from 1995).
[Vol. 49:449
Adverse Drug Reactions
on the market. They also demonstrate the variety of problems that can
arise after the FDA decides, based on the pre-approval clinical trials, that
a new drug is safe and effective for use by the public. Although the FDA
approved none of the recently withdrawn drugs under either the expe-
dited or accelerated review procedures, the recent cluster of drug with-
drawals in the wake of the implementation of these regulations has gen-
erated alarm among observers from the scientific community and the
public.
A. Weight-Loss Medications
In September 1997, the FDA recalled the popular diet drug Redux
(dexfenfluramine) from the market after physicians and the agency
linked it with heart valve abnormalities in a substantial percentage of
women who took the drug.'6 As part of the pre-approval process, an in-
dependent panel of scientific experts typically evaluates the drug's safety
and effectiveness and votes whether to recommend approval to the FDA.
In the case of Redux, the FDA and members of its advisory committee
initially expressed reluctance about approving Redux because clinical
studies demonstrated an association between the drug and primary pul-
monary hypertension."' At a second meeting in April 1996, the advisory
committee recommended marketing the drug.' After the drug received
marketing approval, the FDA discovered that the drug's manufacturer
had received reports of prior marketing experience in Europe that ap-
peared to implicate the drug in a series of unexplained heart valve prob-
lems, and that the manufacturer had not conveyed this information to the
FDA. 63
160. See Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 1728.
161. See Una D. McCann et al., Brain Serotonin Neurotoxicity and Primary Pulmonary
Hypertension from Fenfluramine and Dexfenfluramine: A Systematic Review of the Evi-
dence, 278 JAMA 666, 669 (1997) (describing the link between these drugs and pulmonary
hypertension-a rare but serious, and often fatal, disease).
162. See Alicia Ault, Anti-Obesity Drugs Recalled from Global Market, 350 LANCET
867, 867 (1997) (describing the timeline of events for the approval and marketing of Pon-
dimin and Redux).
163. See Laura Johannes & Steve Stecklow, Early Warning: Heart-Valve Problem That
Felled Diet Pills Had Arisen Previously, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1997, at Al. The drug's
manufacturer, American Home Products, originally submitted the application for mar-
keting approval to the FDA in May 1993. The drug was already available in Europe.
Later that year, a Belgian cardiologist discovered that six of his patients who were taking a
combination of dexfenfluramine and fenfluramine had developed a valvular heart disor-
der. The company apparently received reports of this information. See AHP Stock Falls 4
Percent Following News Reports that Heart Valve Problems Were Not Reported to FDA,
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: DRUGS & MED. DEVICES, Dec. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS,
Health Library, MEADMD file (suggesting that physicians in Belgium had detected pat-
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The weight-conscious American society created a substantial demand
for the drug.164 Some physicians began to prescribe Redux for long-term
use despite label warnings about the dangers of exceeding the usage pe-
riods tested in the pre-approval trials.16 As ominous data about side ef-
fects began to accumulate, however, the FDA grew increasingly con-
cerned. Citing the previously understood link between Redux and
pulmonary hypertension, as well as severe heart problems and brain
damage, the FDA requested a voluntary withdraw of the drug.'
66
The term "fen-phen" refers to a frequently-prescribed combination of
one of two diet drugs, Pondimin (fenfluramine) or Redux (dexfenflura-
mine), with the amphetamine phentermine. Although the two drugs re-
ceived approval individually, the FDA never reviewed the combination,
which makes it an "off-label," though lawful, use.167 During the same pe-
riod in 1997 when problems with Redux (used alone) became apparent,
physicians at the Mayo Clinic noted that women taking Pondimin or Re-
dux in combination with phentermine were developing serious and un-
usual heart valve problems.'9 The physicians reported their findings to
the FDA, which then called for reports of similar cases and received
terns of heart valve damage associated with Redux use by 1994); Questions Arise About
FDA's Previous Approval of Diet Drugs, MED. INDUS. TODAY, Sept. 17, 1997, at 1.
164. See Gregory D. Curfman, Editorial, Diet Pills Redux, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 629,
630 (1997) (recommending that physicians prescribe diet drugs only for patients with "le-
gitimate health indication[s] for the use of the drugs" and not for patients who seek to lose
weight "principally for cosmetic reasons"); Sue Miller, Quick Fix: Do Diet Pills Work?,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 21, 1997, at 64 (noting that more than 18 million prescriptions for fen-
phen and over 3 million prescriptions for Redux were filled in one recent year).
165. See Salbu, supra note 57, at 127-28 (1999) (describing patterns of "indiscriminate
use" of obesity drugs and the American obsession with thinness).
166. See Centers for Disease Control, Cardiac Valvulopathy Associated with Exposure
to Fenfluramine or Dexfenfluramine: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services In-
terim Public Health Recommendations, November 1997, 278 JAMA 1729 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter CDC Recommendations] (describing 144 reports received from health care providers
describing heart valve problems in patients taking one or both components of fen-phen,
113 of which were considered abnormal, and noting that 27 cases required valve replace-
ment surgery and that three patients died after surgery).
167. See Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products,
16 J. PRODS. & Toxics LIAB. 139, 157 (1994) (noting that the FDA has in the past at-
tempted to combat such uses of approved thyroid drugs for weight loss by requiring
warnings); see also Salbu, supra note 57, at 14-25 (noting that neither of these drugs is new
to the market-the FDA approved phentermine in 1959 and fenfluramine in 1973). In
fact, the drug combination was never studied for safety and efficacy in animals or humans.
See Heidi M. Connolly et al., Valvular Heart Disease Associated with Fenfluramine-
Phentermine, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 581, 588 (1997).
168. See Friedman et al., supra note 16, at 1728 (describing a report from Mayo Clinic
researchers of 24 cases of valvular disease and aortic and mitral valve regurgitation in pa-
tients taking the drug combination).
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nearly 100 responses.169 Additional studies conducted at five separate
universities found that one-third of patients taking the drug combination
had heart valve damage, though subsequent reports suggested lower fre-
quencies. 170 The FDA then requested voluntary withdrawal of Pondimin
from the market.7
The eventual detection of heart valve defects associated with fen-phen
prompted concern within the medical community. Because the FDA
knew prior to approval that both Pondimin and Redux could cause pul-
monary hypertension, a rare but deadly side-effect, critics of the post-
approval monitoring system questioned why the agency had not re-
quired, as a condition of its marketing, that physicians and epidemiology
centers more closely monitor and report problems with the drug. The
clinical experience and professional intuition of health care professionals
treating their obese patients appears to have been the primary factor
leading to the discovery of the link between these diet drugs and heart
valve damage. Although the FDA received the initial voluntary physi-
cian reports and then called for more information that eventually led to
the drugs' removal from the market, the regulatory system that mandates
manufacturer reporting seems to have played only a minor role in the ul-
timate outcome. It may be reasonable, therefore, to question whether
the FDA's heavy reliance on voluntary physician reporting makes sense,
or whether some restructuring of the system might represent a more ap-
propriate approach.
169. See Kolata, supra note 12, at F8.
170. See Curfman, supra note 164, at 629 (summarizing recent findings, and explaining
the poorly understood mechanisms that may cause damage to heart valves in patients
taking the drugs).
171. See Gina Kolata, How Fen-Phen, A Diet "Miracle," Rose and Fell, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1997, at F1; see also CDC Recommendations, supra note 166, at 1729-30 (recom-
mending that health care practitioners continue reporting heart valve problems associated
with these drugs to the FDA and "strongly consider" performing an echocardiogram on
patients who have taken either drug combination). Technically, the FDA can only en-
courage, but not mandate, a recall. See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the
Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 887-88 (de-
scribing significant limitations on the FDA's mandatory recall authority). Although the
FDA recalled fenfluramine, phentermine remains on the market even though some com-
mentators suggest that it was the primary culprit. See Denise Grady, Search for Cause of
Diet Pill's Risk Yields New Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1999, at F2.
172. See Kolata, supra note 12, at F8; see also McCann et al., supra note 161, at 670
(supporting a planned phase IV study to help identify patient factors likely to lead to pul-
monary hypertension from use of fen-phen, and advocating a more careful risk/benefit as-
sessment during the prescribing process).
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B. Liver Toxicity Problems
Measures of liver function are a significant indicator of how the body
metabolizes many types of medications. When the liver cannot, for some
reason, properly break down a drug, the patient may experience some
form of liver failure. More typically, a patient experiences a problem
with liver function such as an elevated level of liver transaminase en-
zymes, or symptoms such as jaundice, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain,
loss of appetite, or dark urine. In severe cases, the liver may fail com-
pletely and require transplantation. '73 Because of the serious risks asso-
ciated with drugs that affect liver function, researchers use metabolic
studies and clinical trials to detect liver problems associated with new
drugs so that physicians can prescribe these products safely.
The painkiller Duract (bromfenac sodium) first entered the market in
July 1997. By the time the FDA withdrew approval for marketing in
June 1998, the drug apparently had caused four deaths due to liver toxic-
ity and required liver transplants in eight other patients. 4 During clini-
cal trials of Duract, researchers discovered an unexpectedly high inci-
dence of elevated liver enzymes in patients who took the drug for
relatively long periods, but experts disagreed about the significance of
these problems.7 1 One FDA medical officer expressed serious concerns
about the drug's potential to produce liver toxicity, and he argued in fa-
vor of attaching the agency's most stringent warnings to the drug's la-
beling at the outset. 17 The FDA chose to approve the product only for
short-term use (ten days or less), and included information about ele-
vated liver enzymes in the product labeling.
As the FDA became aware of liver problems in patients taking Duract
during the year that the drug was available, it took interim steps to notify
physicians of emerging safety problems.' Despite the labeling informa-
173. See Liver Injuries Prompt Warning for Diabetes Drug, FDA CONSUMER,
Jan./Feb. 1998 (describing the range of potential liver complications associated with use of
the drug).
174. See Stolberg, supra note 2, at Al.
175. See Rochelle Sharpe, How a Drug Approved by the FDA Turned into a Lethal
Failure, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1998, at Al (commenting, on the Duract pre-approval
evaluation, that "despite the lengthy screening process, it still was the public that con-
ducted the final trial that led to the drug's undoing").
176. See id. Dr. Rudolph Widmark noted that Duract appeared to cause more liver-
cell damage than any other drug of its kind, suggested that the drug be used for no more
than 14 days at a time, and expressed concern that, because there were already many other
similar analgesics on the market, physicians might not read the new drug's labeling very
carefully. See id. Dr. Widmark's concerns were well-founded; some patients received pre-
scriptions for several month's worth of the drug. See id.
177. The FDA sent a letter to physicians warning that the drug was unsafe when used
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tion, some physicians prescribed Duract for longer than ten days, and the
agency began receiving reports of liver failure. The FDA responded by
requiring prominent boxed warnings in the drug's labeling, and the
manufacturer issued a "Dear Doctor" letter emphasizing the drug's dan-
gers and describing the parameters for proper use. 78 These efforts did
not completely prevent the inappropriate prescribing of Duract for long-
term use. Thus, in June 1998, after the FDA concluded that it could not
impose effective restrictions on the duration of use, the manufacturer
voluntarily withdrew the drug from the market.179
Recent adverse drug reaction reports have linked the diabetes drug
Rezulin (troglitazone) with forty-three cases of acute liver failure, in-
cluding twenty-eight deaths.' 8 The drug had generated optimism among
physicians treating patients with diabetes because clinical trials suggested
that it could eliminate the need for insulin treatment in many diabetics.
1 81
The lead FDA reviewer opposed the approval of the drug based on the
manufacturer's inadequate safety testing as well as animal and clinical
trials that suggested an association between use of the drug and jaundice.
Nevertheless, the FDA removed the reviewer from the NDA panel and
approved the drug with unusual speed.'8 Because of the drug's unique-
ness and potential positive effect on the lives of many patients, the
agency may have felt strong pressure to approve the drug despite early
evidence of liver toxicity during the clinical trials.
The FDA approved Rezulin in January 1997. By the end of that year,
however, an increase in ADRs forced the agency to warn physicians to
longer than the 10-days tested in the clinical trials. It also required the manufacturer to
add a large boxed warning to the drug's label describing the potential fatal hepatic compli-
cations, including jaundice and fulminant hepatitis, associated with Duract. See Sharpe,
supra note 175, at Al; Summaries of "Dear Health Professional" Letters and Other Safety
Notifications, FDA MED. BUL., Summer 1998, available in <http://www.fda.gov/medbull/
summer98/summarie.html>.
178. See Letter from Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories to "Dear Health Care Professional"
(Feb. 10, 1998), available in <http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/safety/1998/duract.htm>
(warning about bromfenac).
179. See FDA, Wyeth-A yerst Laboratories Announces the Withdrawal of Duract from
the Market, Talk Paper No. T98-36, June 22, 1998, available in <http://www.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/ANSWERS/ANS00879.html>.
180. See John Schwartz, FDA Panel Backs Diabetes Drug, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1999,
at A6; see also Letter from Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories to "Dear Health Care Profes-
sional" (June 22, 1998), available in <http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/safety/1998/
duract3.htm> (withdrawing the drug).
181. See Natalie Hopkinson, Advocacy Group Petitions FDA to Ban Diabetes Drug
Troglitazone, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1998, at B6.
182. See Schwartz, supra note 49, at Al (noting that the reviewer on the Rezulin NDA
panel was removed after Warner-Lambert officials accused the reviewer of inappropriate
language and behavior during panel meetings).
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monitor their patients closely for liver damage. The FDA required the
sponsor to print more prominent boxed warnings on the drug's label, and
it recommended that physicians test patients' liver function regularly, es-
pecially during the first six months of drug use. 83 The drug's manufac-
turer continues to market Rezulin, asserting that its risks are justified be-
cause the drug offers a unique therapy and because the incidence of
adverse effects is only one out of 60,000 patients who take the drug.
An FDA advisory committee met to review the drug's safety and con-
curred, by a vote of eleven to one, with the position of the manufacturer;
one year later, the agency opted to withdraw marketing approval for Re-
zulin because of 63 fatalities linked to the drug.85
Problems associated with liver function in patients taking new drugs
continue to appear and demand close monitoring. The FDA recently
warned physicians not to prescribe another new drug, the antibiotic Tro-
van (trovafloxacin), except to treat life-threatening infections because
the drug appears to cause liver damage. The agency has recommended
strict prescribing and monitoring restrictions for the drug's continued
use,' 6 and the drug's future remains uncertain. For now, the drug's
manufacturer will continue to market Trovan in the United States. In
Europe, however, the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products has
recommended a marketing suspension for one year so that scientists and
physicians can more carefully evaluate the drug's risks.'8'
183. See FDA Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee Minutes at
13 (Mar. 26, 1999), available in <http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/99/transcpt/
3499tl.rtf>.
184. See Schwartz, supra note 49, at Al (noting also that the company believes that
better post-approval monitoring for liver problems in patients taking Rezulin will further
reduce the future incidence of adverse side effects).
185. See Schwartz, supra note 180, at A6 (noting also that the advisory panel voted
eight to four to recommend that the drug not be used as a first-line therapy for diabetes,
and that it not be used alone but only in combination with insulin); Denise Grady, F.D.A.
Withdraws Drug for Diabetics, Citing Health Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2000, at Al. An
FDA spokesperson stated that the agency "had changed its position on Rezulin because
data on ... two newer drugs showed them to be safer" to treat the same condition. Id.
186. In order to ensure that physicians comply with the prescribing and monitoring
recommendations (short-term use for 14 days or less), the FDA now only permits pre-
scribing in inpatient health care facilities where careful monitoring of liver function is fea-
sible. Adverse drug reaction reports suggest that five patients have died as a result of
taking the drug, and another 14 patients have suffered acute liver failure. See FDA Heeds
Urging to Ban Trovan Use, Warns of Reported Liver Toxicity, MEALEY'S EMERGING




C. Unexpected Drug Interactions
Recent reports have uncovered a serious and unexpected drug interac-
tion problem with a number of prescription drugs. Practically speaking,
it is virtually impossible for a manufacturer to test a new chemical entity
with every other medication that might create an adverse interaction."
During the clinical trials process, a sponsor of an NDA must select, with
input from the FDA, likely drugs to test in combination with its new drug
in order to uncover potential drug interactions. Those who evaluate drug
safety find it particularly difficult to predict drug interactions at the clini-
cal trials phase of the new drug evaluation process because many vari-
ables, such as particular patient sensitivities and lifestyle habits, confound
the causation assessment.
For example, in pre-approval trials for the blood pressure and angina
medication Posicor (mibefradil), the sponsor tested the new drug with
drugs selected as likely combinations, including drugs that the sponsor
believed would create adverse interactions. The FDA advisory commit-
tee voted five to three to approve Posicor, with the dissenters expressing
serious concerns about the drug's safety based on the clinical studies. 189
Although at the time of approval the agency was aware that Posicor
tended to interact badly with other commonly-prescribed drugs, it took
the widespread use of the drug after approval to demonstrate the magni-
tude of the problem. The reported ADRs suggested that Posicor inter-
acts negatively with as many as two dozen other prescription drugs.' 9°
Furthermore, the patients for whom doctors prescribe the drug are
mainly elderly and often have multiple health problems; thus, these pa-
tients tended to take a variety of prescription drugs concurrently, thereby
increasing the odds of a negative interaction. Numerous reports of ad-
verse drug interactions, including low heart rates, irregular heartbeats,
kidney damage, and twenty-four reported deaths, convinced the FDA to
withdraw its approval of the drug. 9 After less than one year on the
188. See Langreth, supra note 25, at B16 (describing Posicor's interactions with several
cholesterol-lowering drugs).
189. See id. (noting that one of the dissenters, Dr. Lemuel Moye of the University of
Texas Health Science Center, expressed concern about the "stampede for efficiency in
getting drugs approved" and believes that the FDA should require drug companies to
conduct longer clinical studies before granting marketing approval).
190. See id. (noting that Posicor is the latest in a large class of drugs called calcium-
channel blockers).
191. See Roche Laboratories Announces Withdrawal of Posicor from the Market, Talk
Paper No. T98-33, June 8, 1998, available in <http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/
ANS00876.html> (noting that the drug reduces the activity of certain liver enzymes which
metabolize other drugs, causing the other drugs to accumulate in the body at dangerously
20001
Catholic University Law Review
market, the manufacturer discontinued the sale of Posicor. At the time
of the withdrawal, more than 200,000 patients in the United States and
400,000 patients in other countries had taken the drug.' 9
The FDA recently warned physicians that they should prescribe the
heartburn drug Propulsid (cisapride) only as a therapy of last resort be-
cause of its tendency to cause serious heart-rhythm problems when com-
bined with a variety of other medications.' 93 Since its approval in 1993,
millions of patients have taken Propulsid. The FDA has received reports
of at least seventy deaths associated with the use of Propulsid 94 though
doubts remain about the causal connection between the drug and these
deaths. Because of these accumulating reports, the manufacturer agreed
to add new warnings to the product's labeling. The FDA has not yet re-
quested a recall of the drug, but it has asked the drug's manufacturer to
send out 800,000 "Dear Doctor" letters to warn physicians of the drug's
potential problems.'95
Accumulating evidence also suggests that other popular drugs may
pose unjustifiable interaction hazards. For example, the allergy drug
Seldane (terfenadine) was available by prescription for twelve years be-
fore mounting evidence of adverse interactions with a variety of other
prescription drugs, such as cardiac arrhythmias, began to cause con-
cern.1' The drug's manufacturer voluntarily agreed to discontinue selling
Seldane in February 1998 under strong pressure from the FDA.'
97
high levels). Critics of the FDA question why the drug was approved in the first place.
Dr. Sidney Wolfe, the director of Public Citizen's Health Research Group, commented
that "when you've got a drug that no one remotely thinks is any better than any of the
other eight or nine already on the market, why for the purpose of public health or public
safety do you approve it?" Stolberg, supra note 2, at Al.
192. See id.
193. See Robert Langreth & Rochelle Sharpe, Drug May Pose Risks, FDA Warns of
Side Effects from Propulsid, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1998, at B5.
194. See Jane E. Henney, Revised Labeling for Cisapride, 283 JAMA 1131 (2000).
195. See Langreth & Sharpe, supra note 193, at B5 (noting that Johnson & Johnson,
the manufacturer of Propulsid, issued warnings to physicians at the request of the FDA
about potential adverse effects when the drug is taken in combination with certain antide-
pressants, antibiotics, antifungals, and protease inhibitors, among other medications); see
also Letter from Janssen Pharmaceutical Research Foundation to Healthcare Profession-
als (June 26, 1998), available in <http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/safety/1998/propul.htm>.
196. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey & Robert Langreth, Viagra's Lesson: New Drugs, Un-
known Risks, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1998, at B1; see also Kessler, supra note 125, at 2765
(describing Seldane's interaction with antifungal and antibiotic drugs, and noting that in-
dividual differences in drug metabolism can cause a wide range of patient responses to the
same drug or drug combination).
197. See Summaries of "Dear Health Professional" Letters, supra note 177. Late in
1997, the manufacturers reformulated and released the drug under a new brand name. See
Denise Grady, Need Is Seen for a Drug Safety Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1998, at D7
(describing reformulation and re-release of terfenadine under the brand name Allegra).
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The popular new impotence drug Viagra (sildenafil), which became
available in April 1998,1' was associated with 130 deaths in the first eight
months of its marketing.1 9 Although its labeling warns physicians against
prescribing Viagra to patients who have cardiac problems or who take
nitrate medications, the FDA has received numerous reports of cardiac
irregularities in patients who take the drug.2°° Because male impotence
often accompanies serious heart disease, Viagra users predictably will
take other prescription medications concurrently. The interaction be-
tween the medications, combined with the physical stresses of inter-
course, appears to have triggered heart attacks or strokes in some of
these patients.201 Viagra's sponsor studied the drug's safety when used
with ten other drugs, ranging from the antacid Maalox to the antibiotic
erythromycin and the blood thinner warfarin. However, because the
company knew of the risk of using Viagra in combination with nitrates, it
excluded patients who were taking this type of drug from its clinical tri-
als. In addition, a number of the patients who died were taking the drug
in combination with other medications that the company had not studied
in its trials.2 Eight months after Pfizer began marketing the drug, the
FDA required new label warnings about its safety,"3 and it will continue
to monitor Viagra closely.
In the last two years, patients have encountered a number of unantici-
pated drug-related hazards including pulmonary hypertension and heart
valve damage from diet drugs, liver toxicity from several different drugs,
and a series of dangerous interactions involving prescription medications.
This constellation of drug hazards has led some critics to question both
the effectiveness of the pre-approval system, and the ability of the post-
approval safety surveillance system to detect and respond quickly to pre-
viously-unknown drug risks. Conversely, to the extent that the FDA
feels insecure about the effectiveness of its post-approval monitoring sys-
198. See Jeffrey & Langreth, supra note 196, at B1 (noting that, in the first 10 weeks of
its marketing, pharmacists filled approximately 1.7 million new prescriptions for the drug).
199. See Rochelle Sharpe & Robert Langreth, Pfizer and FDA Agree to New Warnings
on Labels for Viagra, Behind 130 Deaths, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1998, at B7.
200. See id. (noting that 70% of the men who died while using Viagra had one or more
risk factors for cardiovascular disease).
201. See Jeffrey & Langreth, supra note 196, at B1.
202. See id.
203. See New Warning Issued on Use of Viagra, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998, at A23
(describing five separate points in the warnings: information about sudden cardiac death
and hypertension; priapism; temporary low blood pressure; contraindications for men with
unstable angina, retinitis pigmentosa, stroke; and other cardiac problems); see also Sharpe
& Langreth, supra note 199, at B7 (describing new warning requirements).
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tern, there is a risk that it may overreact to an apparent crisis.Y4 Al-
though the agency recently has defended both its pre-approval and post-
approval regulatory approach, it has also acknowledged that there is
room for improvement.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Currently, the FDA has at its disposal a range of possible responses to
the problems associated with ADRs. It has only begun, however, to
tackle the problem of how to improve the quality and quantity of the in-
formation on which it bases its responses. Moreover, the FDA does not
appear to have seriously considered expanded and more formalized roles
for the medical profession, or for other federal agencies, which might
permit better responses to the negative impact of ADRs on patient care.
Congress and the FDA can implement a variety of changes that would
improve the ability of physicians, manufacturers, patients, and the FDA
itself to gather and use information about side effects associated with
new drugs. Many of the proposed approaches discussed below would re-
quire the FDA, the CDC, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and health care
providers to participate more actively in the collection and analysis of
population-based ADR data. This participation is necessary to ensure
that the risks accompanying prescription drug therapy, which plays such
a significant role in the treatment and prevention of illness, remain
justified by the benefits.
A. Changes in Regulatory Emphasis
Increased FDA resources represent one obvious response to the
problem of identifying and dealing with adverse drug reactions. Addi-
tional regulatory staff are already available at the pre-approval stage to
meet the public demand that NDAs be reviewed in a timely fashion. The
agency also needs additional staff to implement a more effective post-
approval monitoring process in response to the problems arising from the
204. The FDA's approach toward problems associated with breast implants is reveal-
ing. See Marcia Angell, Shattuck Lecture-Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants:
The Interplay of Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1513, 1514 (1996) (describing how the FDA's initial "relaxed attitude" towards silicone
gel-filled breast implants changed in response to public outcry about anecdotal reports of
auto-immune disease in women with the implants and large jury verdicts to plaintiffs who
complained of injury from the devices). The agency finally banned the devices "not be-
cause implants had been found dangerous, but because they had not been proved safe,"
and one commentator suggested that the FDA's response was unjustifiably drastic and
caused a panic in many women who received the implants. See id.
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increasing stream of newly-approved drugs.205 Congress and the FDA
clearly recognize the need for increased funding, and they appear to be
taking steps in the right direction." In addition to increased appropria-
tions, Congress should consider amending the statutory provisions
authorizing user fees and targeting a percentage of fees specifically for
adverse drug reaction monitoring, instead of directing all of the user fee
proceeds towards increasing personnel to review NDAs. 7
Separately, the FDA should continue its effort to improve the clarity
of its existing post-approval reporting requirements. The agency might
accomplish this goal by amending its existing regulations, or it might is-
sue additional guidelines to aid in the interpretation of the regulations.2 6
Because current regulations provide manufacturers some leeway to make
judgments about whether to forward ADRs to the FDA, commentators
have expressed concern that the FDA sees only a fraction of the reports
that physicians forward to manufacturers.2 °9 Clarifying reporting re-
quirements may help to diminish the underreporting that arises from a
lack of understanding of certain key regulatory terms. Past regulatory
amendments and guidance documents, however, have proven somewhat
ineffective at increasing the rate of ADR reporting.
The accelerated approval procedures may pose a heightened risk of er-
ror in the pre-approval safety assessment process and can create undesir-
able pressure on the agency's post-approval system by increasing the
overall volume of reports. In order to facilitate post-approval surveil-
lance of these new drugs, the FDA could narrow the class of eligible
products or establish restrictions on distribution. At the front end, the
FDA recently has limited the availability of fast-track review to drugs
205. In 1998, the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) redesig-
nated its Division of Pharmacovigilance and Epidemiology to become the Office of Post-
marketing Drug Risk Assessment. See CDER REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 13, at
22.
206. See Charles Marwick, FDA May Get Welcome New Funds in Its Budget, 281
JAMA 888, 888 (1999) (describing the FDA's proposed 2000 budget requesting an in-
crease of 16% ($216 million) over its 1999 budget to enable the agency to focus on im-
proving surveillance of adverse drug events and postmarket quality assurance).
207. Other commentators also have recognized the pressing need for additional re-
sources targeted at postmarket drug safety monitoring, and they have proposed both pub-
lic and private funding initiatives for this purpose. See, e.g., Gelijns et al., supra note 45, at
697 (proposing public funding to investigate potentially beneficial uses of new drugs, and
noting that such research presumably also would yield additional safety information).
208. See supra notes 96-106 (describing existing guidelines).
209. See Green, supra note 114, at 499 n.139 (describing examples of "flagrant manu-
facturer disregard" for ADR reporting requirements).
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that have the potential to respond to "unmet medical needs." 10 Thera-
peutic substitutes for already-marketed drugs that provide no significant
additional benefit to patients do not warrant accelerated approval 1
In practice, some physicians refrain from prescribing new drugs when
existing drugs (with a more developed safety profile) will accomplish the
desired results.2  As a final step in the NDA process, the FDA might
consider formally classifying certain newly-approved drugs as "high risk"
to assist physicians in identifying drugs that should be used with extra
caution. 3 It already makes such determinations on an ad hoc basis. For
example, the FDA recently decided to permit the sale of thalidomide for
treatment of Hansen's Disease (leprosy), and it attached unusually strin-
gent prescribing safeguards as a condition of marketing approval for this
purpose. 4 Such a classification system might revolve around three easy-
210. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
115, § 506(a)(1), 111 Stat. 2296, 2309 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356 (Supp. III 1997)); see also
id. § 561(c)(2), 111 Stat. at 2366 (limiting treatment INDs to conditions for which "there is
no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy available"); Salbu, supra note 57, at 139
(noting the ambiguity surrounding the question of whether safe and effective drug treat-
ments are available).
211. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (discussing the approval and sub-
sequent withdrawal of Duract, a NSAID that joined the market with a large group of al-
ready-approved NSAIDs). Although Duract was not approved under accelerated or expe-
dited review, the safety problems that became apparent prior to approval suggest that the
agency might have been more cautious and demanded additional safety data before per-
mitting the drug to enter the market. See Stolberg, supra note 2, at Al (discussing a pro-
posal to limit fast-track approval only to breakthrough drugs, not "me too" drugs). As
one commentator recently stated: "The more effective and safe the approved treatments,
the less urgent the patient's need for alternatives, and hence the weaker the patient's
claims of exigency." Salbu, supra note 57, at 139.
212. See Rochelle Sharpe, MedWatch System Comes Under Fire: FDA Defends Drug
Monitoring as Physicians, Advocates Are Cautious, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1998, at B5.
213. See FDA Gets Advice on Modernization Act Compliance, 280 JAMA 1214, 1214
(1998) (describing various recommendations concerning prescription drug safety and the
reporting of adverse drug reactions, including creating a high-risk drug category to alert
physicians that certain drugs require especially close monitoring). Studies have recognized
the risks associated with the hasty prescribing of new, and relatively untested, drugs. One
British study noted that physicians who prescribed newly-approved drugs most heavily
were also least likely to file adverse reaction reports. See William Inman & Gillian Pearce,
Prescriber Profile and Post-Marketing Surveillance, 342 LANCET 658, 659-60 (1993).
214. See FDA, FDA Approves Thalidomide for Hansen's Disease Side Effect, Imposes
Unprecedented Restrictions on Distribution, Talk Paper No. T98-44 (July 16, 1998)
<http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00887.html> [hereinafter FDA Talk Pa-
per]. Thalidomide shows tremendous promise in the treatment of Hansen's Disease, as
well as lupus, AIDS, and other auto-immune diseases, but the potential for devastating
birth defects remains. Many may question the wisdom of marketing this drug under any
circumstances, yet the FDA believes that it has implemented sufficient restrictions and
safeguards to prevent the birth of children with Thalidomide injuries. The manufacturer
of Thalidomide, Celgene, plans to engage the Sloane Epidemiology Unit of Boston Uni-
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to-distinguish categories of newly-approved drugs. "Category I" could
refer to drugs approved on an accelerated basis for which the FDA re-
quires post-approval studies as a condition of continued marketing.
"Category II" might apply to newly-approved drugs that raise unusual
lingering safety concerns, which are elaborated elsewhere in the package
insert, but that promise a previously unavailable benefit to patients.215
"Category III" could refer to drugs that, while newly-approved, appear
to raise no significant safety concerns, either because they are closely re-
lated to drugs with an established safety profile or because the agency's
pre-approval review left no lingering safety concerns unresolved.216
Other changes in the adverse drug event reporting system would help
to shift the FDA and corporate mindset away from the traditional ap-
proach, which requires manufacturers to send reports of ADRs to the
agency, to a more cooperative approach between pharmaceutical manu-
facturers and health care providers.217 For example, although the FDA
generally lacks jurisdiction over the practice of medicine,2' a require-
versity to monitor prescriptions in order to trace the birth of any Thalidomide babies. See
Kolata, supra note 12, at F1. The FDA requires as a condition of marketing that Celgene
implement the "System for Thalidomide Education and Prescribing Safety (STEPS)" pro-
gram. See FDA Talk Paper, supra. Under the terms of STEPS, only registered physicians
may prescribe Thalidomide to patients, who must comply with mandatory contraceptive
requirements and mandatory pregnancy testing. See id. Thalidomide's dangers are well-
documented, permitting the FDA to monitor its use with due care. The problem of ap-
propriate post-approval monitoring remains, however, for other, newer drugs whose dan-
gerous side-effects are yet undiscovered.
215. Rezulin represents an example of such a drug because, although the reviewing
panel expressed concern about its liver toxicity, see supra note 186, it provides a new
mechanism of action to manage diabetes.
216. Cf. Margaret Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory Com-
pliance, and Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481, 1496-98 (1994) (advocating
that a digest of current scientific studies about drug safety issues that the FDA is consid-
ering, but has not yet acted upon, be made available to physicians). The FDA has used
similar classification systems in reviewing the effectiveness of drugs first approved before
1962, active ingredients in OTC drugs, and medical devices. See id.
217. One group of commentators has explored methods of ADR data collection for
physicians in the hospital setting and has recommended a computer monitoring strategy as
one method for identifying drug problems while minimizing the shortcomings of other,
more labor-intensive approaches such as chart review. See Jha et al., supra note 20, at
311-12.
218. See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (Supp. III 1997) (medical devices); 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504
(1972) (concluding that "it is clear that Congress did not intend the [FDA] to regulate or
interfere with the practice of medicine"). Required physician participation in a health-
related safety reporting system is not unprecedented. Nearly all states mandate physician
reporting of suspected cases of child abuse. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413(1)
(McKinney 1999). Physicians must also report patient threats to individual intended vic-
tims, certain types of communicable diseases, and gunshot and knife wounds. See CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 121, Op. 5.05.
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ment that physicians send reports of suspected drug reactions directly to
the agency, rather than to manufacturers, would increase the rate of re-
porting serious adverse events, to which safety reviewers at the FDA
would give special attention.219 After all, physicians can best detect pos-
sible connections between prescription drugs and patient problems. Al-
though the FDA can work to clarify and strengthen post-approval re-
porting procedures, health care professionals have an equally important
ethical duty to report ADRs,22° which serves the interests of their current
and future patients.
B. Generating Better Data
Additional resources and clearer regulatory requirements alone will
not, however, provide an adequate response to the problem of identify-
ing unexpected adverse drug events. Several approaches might help to
improve the quality and quantity of data on which health care profes-
sionals base their prescribing decisions.
Congress should consider authorizing explicit Phase IV study require-
ments for all newly-approved drugs, not just for those approved under an
accelerated review process.22 In contrast to the current approach of pas-
sively waiting for additional information about new drugs from manufac-
turers and health care providers, required Phase IV post-approval studies
or other special post-market surveillance conditions could more readily
generate additional information early in the marketing process and in a
more systematic fashion.2  The FDA and the industry should make bet-
ter use of the opportunities that Phase IV studies present in order to
uncover serious or rare adverse drug reactions and interactions more
219. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
220. See supra Part I.B.2.
221. The FDA long ago issued regulations to govern postmarketing research. See Ap-
proved New Drugs that Require Continuation of Long Term Studies, Records, and Re-
ports, 35 Fed. Reg. 14,784 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R § 310.303 (1999)). Ex-
cept for fast-track drug approvals, the FDA does not appear to have the power to require
Phase IV trials. A few courts have, however, held that manufacturers of prescription
drugs have an obligation to conduct post approval studies to clarify risks. See, e.g., Ko-
ciemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517,1528-29 (D. Minn. 1989).
222. The FDA has conditioned NDA approval on a requirement of specific post-
approval research or other special monitoring and safety controls many times in the past.
In addition to the controls described above for the marketing of Thalidomide, the agency
has required large postmarketing surveillance studies and smaller post-approval research
studies for a variety of other drugs. See Nancy Mattison & Barbara W. Richard, Postap-
proval Research Requested by the FDA at the Time of NCE Approval, 1970-1984, 21 DRUG
INFO. J. 309, 309 (1987). One study found that the FDA had conditioned its approval of
one-third to one-half of new drugs on the NDA sponsor's conducting additional post-
approval safety studies. See id. at 323.
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quickly.2 Simple post-approval safety trials will detect rarer adverse re-
actions by studying a large, diverse group of patients." In the past, the
FDA has required special surveillance protections as a condition for
marketing of some new drugs and also for some medical devices.2z If the
agency implemented the categorization system for newly-approved drugs
as described above, it could require large, simple post-approval trials for
Categories I and II to generate high quality safety data in the early
phases of the drugs' marketing. Such an approach would quickly provide
the FDA with a greater amount of controlled data from which to draw
conclusions about possible serious side effects associated with recently
approved new drugs.226 This would also shift the additional financial bur-
den of gathering such information to the private sector.
Likewise, the clinical research community plays a vital role in detecting
adverse reactions associated with investigational and newly approved
drugs. In addition to requiring physician reporting of ADRs via the
MedWatch system, the FDA should consider permitting clinical re-
searchers and physicians access to information concerning ADRs directly
from a centralized database so that these health care providers can use
the information in making prescription decisions. 7 Physicians may em-
brace a required reporting scheme more readily if they are allowed easy
access to the data that results from their efforts. Clinical researchers and
223. See Woosley, supra note 39, at 187-88.
224. See Marwick, supra note 10, at 316.
225. For example, the acne drug Accutane, manufactured by Hoffman-La Roche, is
marketed under a program that requires doctors to register all women for whom they pre-
scribe the drug. The drug causes severe birth defects in the children of women who take
the drug during pregnancy. Boston University's Sloane Epidemiology Unit monitors the
registry, which enrolled 24,503 women during its first seven years. See Kolata, supra note
12, at F8. During that period, 402 of the enrolled women became pregnant while taking
the drug; although most of these women had abortions, 32 babies were born, one with se-
rious birth defects. See id. Critics point out that the problem with such registry surveil-
lance programs is that they rely on physicians to encourage their patients to participate.
See id. When a physician fails to be conscientious about prescribing the drug and moni-
toring the patient, the system breaks down, with potentially disastrous consequences.
226. See Salbu, supra note 57, at 146 (arguing that FDA conservatism should decrease
with the increasing utility of post-approval drug monitoring procedures that can mitigate
potential harm attributable to new drug treatments).
227. Providing access to ADR databases potentially raises problems under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA). See Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994); see also 45 C.F.R. pt. 5 (1998) (Health and Human
Services FOIA regulations). Courts have limited adverse reaction data report disclosure
in the past. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (holding, on remand, that company-specific adverse reaction rates for intraocular
lenses could be withheld under FOIA but that averaged adverse reaction data had to be
disclosed).
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epidemiologists also may be able to use preliminary data to improve the
design of future research into the safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical
products."'
Finally, greater coordination of information-gathering efforts at the na-
tional and international level would clearly enhance the FDA's ability to
respond quickly to a pattern of suspected adverse drug reactions. The
FDA should compile information about ADRs from clinical trials, medi-
cal records, and computerized databases, including the FDA's Med-
Watch database, in one centralized database and evaluate this informa-
tion to detect patterns of adverse reactions."' The FDA has taken an
important step in this direction recently by implementing the Adverse
Event Reporting System (AERS), a computerized database that com-
bines the ADR reports from MedWatch with the required reports from
manufacturers.230 Continued improvement of data coordination should
prove useful without adding significantly to the financial burdens associ-
ated with the drug safety system.
Ideally, improved efforts at coordinating information would take place
at an international level, and the FDA has already begun to expand its
cooperation with foreign governments in recognition of the global mar-
ketplace,' 31 through participation in the International Conference on
Harmonization (ICH).232 It appears, however, that the FDA has directed
228. See Cheryl L. Vogt, Letter to the Editor, Adverse Drug Reactions: Getting Infor-
mation Back from MEDWatch, 272 JAMA 590, 591 (1994) (eliciting a reply from Stuart L.
Nightingale of FDA noting the agency's planned efforts to provide direct access to the
MedWatch database for health professionals).
229. See Timothy Brewer & Graham A. Colditz, Postmarketing Surveillance and Ad-
verse Drug Reactions: Current Perspectives and Future Needs, 281 JAMA 824, 826 (1999)
(advocating the collection and evaluation of data from multiple sources to complement the
information gathered from spontaneous reporting systems).
230. See CDER REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 13, at 23 (explaining that com-
pilations of reports can generate "signals" indicating a potential for serious, previously-
unknown ADRs, which may be analyzed further using epidemiological and analytic data-
bases); FDA Plan for Statutory Compliance, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,000, 65,030 (1998) (describ-
ing the AERS system and the FDA's goal of "revitalized pharmacovigilance"); Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research, Pharmacovigilance Screening (visited Nov. 10, 1999)
<http://www.fda.gov/cder/aers/features.htm> (describing the AERS system's five levels of
analysis for ADR screening).
231. See Sharon Smith Holston, An Overview of International Cooperation, 52 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 197, 197 (1997) (describing the divisions charged with various international
tasks, including "[s]haring some of the regulatory functions with FDA's counterparts
abroad").
232. The ICH is a joint international program designed to discuss which testing proce-
dures should be required to evaluate the safety, quality, and efficacy of new drugs. See
Eric M. Katz, Europe's Centralized New Drug Procedures: Is the United States Prepared to
Keep Pace?, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 301 (1994); Joseph G. Contrera, Comment, The Food
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most of its efforts so far at facilitating the exchange of pre-market
evaluation information. The FDA has started the process of imple-
menting an international exchange of adverse events information, but the
system is not yet fully functional. 3 The European Community's Euro-
pean Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products oversees a cen-
tralized procedure for reporting adverse drug reactions and other new
drug-related safety data, and all EC member states share the data.4 Bet-
ter coordination between the FDA and its foreign counterparts at the
post-approval stage may help to fill this foreign marketing data gap. 3
C. New Models for Post-Approval Safety Surveillance
Some commentators have suggested that one way to compensate for
the scarce agency resources devoted to post-approval monitoring of
drugs is to create a separate and independent drug safety board.3 Such
a board might be industry-funded or independent of both industry and
the FDA."7 An industry-funded board seems appealing, because it
would place the financial burden associated with post-approval surveil-
lance on those entities that benefit financially from the marketing of new
drugs. Such a system would not, however, resolve the inherent conflict of
interest that would exist in requiring the industry to fund and administer
a system to collect adverse data about the products that it relies on for
revenue.38 Even in a cooperative industry venture, the potential for an
and Drug Administration and the International Conference on Harmonization: How Har-
monious Will International Pharmaceutical Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
927 (1995).
233. See CDER REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 13, at 28 (describing the FDA's
collaboration with ICH to minimize duplication in approving and monitoring new drugs
internationally); see also Holston, supra note 231, at 199-200.
234. See Richard F. Kingham et al., The New European Medicines Agency, 49 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 301, 313 (1994).
235. Recently, patient advocacy groups and others have pressured the FDA to ap-
prove certain new drugs that are already available in Europe, and better international co-
ordination of safety and efficacy information will help the agency to respond to these de-
mands, while doing its best to ensure safety. Cf. Merrill, supra note 29, at 1862-63
(describing a proposal to require that the FDA formally accept or justify rejecting ap-
proval decisions for drugs approved in the European Community).
236. See Wood et al., supra note 36, at 1852.
237. See Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and "Privatization"-The Drug Approval
Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 203, 210-11, 225 (1995) (describing the advantages and
disadvantages of privatization of the pre-approval process, and concluding that limited
privatization of discrete agency functions may be feasible).
238. See Wood et al., supra note 36, at 1852-53 (comparing the investigation process
for airplane crashes, and noting that "[w]e do not leave the investigation of such tragedies
solely to the aircraft manufacturer, the airline, or the agency responsible for the regulation
of the industry").
2000]
Catholic University Law Review
over-emphasis on positive data about safety and efficacy and an under-
emphasis on the corresponding negative data remains.
Other areas of safety regulation divide responsibility among different
agencies in order to avoid the potential conflicts of interest inherent in
the FDA model. The FDA plays a dual role in monitoring prescription
drug safety. At the front end, the agency sets and applies regulatory
standards that determine whether an NDA sponsor will be permitted to
market a new drug. At the back end, once a new drug enters the mar-
ket, the FDA sets and applies a different set of regulatory requirements
designed to monitor the safety of the drugs it has approved. The agency
may be loathe to second-guess its pre-approval decisions when it be-
comes apparent that a newly-marketed drug poses unanticipated safety
risks.
In some ways, the ADR manufacturer reporting requirements create a
conflict of interest akin to that of designating an airplane manufacturer
as the sole investigator into a crash of one of its aircraft. 39 To avoid such
a conflict, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates airplane
safety by creating, and enforcing safety standards for aircraft, while the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is charged with directing
the investigation of aviation disasters.2 ° The two regulatory entities play
separate but complementary roles in the safety assurance process.24' In
tandem with investigating particular accidents, the NTSB often forwards
recommendations for modifying standards to the FAA. In this model,
the agency that sets design, operator, and safety standards is not en-
trusted to direct the investigation into situations in which those standards
appear to have failed.242 Instead, the independent NTSB directs the re-
239. See id. at 1852 (noting that, although only 511 fatalities occurred in airline acci-
dents from 1995 to 1997, each accident was investigated thoroughly by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and demanding the "same level of scrutiny" for
ADRs).
240. See 49 U.S.C. § 1131 (1994) (authorizing the NTSB to investigate various types of
transportation accidents under the jurisdiction of other units of the Department of Trans-
portation); Matthew L. Wald, Two Positions on Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1998, at A16
(describing the relationship between the FAA and the NTSB, and discussing recent acci-
dents which led the NTSB to recommend more aggressive safety regulations to the FAA).
241. See The FAA Should Inspect Itself, WASH. POST, May 23, 1996, at A20 (noting
the NTSB's long-running criticism of the FAA); see also Wood et al., supra note 36, at
1851 ("Such independence is essential to ensure objectivity"). For an overview and cri-
tique of the FAA's operations by an outspoken former Inspector General of the Depart-
ment of Transportation, see MARY SCHIAVO, FLYING BLIND (1996).
242. Even in the aviation disaster model, critics complain that airplane manufacturers
play an important role in the investigation process, although such entities assist primarily
with information-gathering and less with analysis and recommendations for the future.
See Matthew L. Wald, Rand to Assess How Federal Safety Board Runs Crash Inquiries,
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quired investigation, drawing on the expertise of the FAA and private
industry as necessary.43 The regulatory model used for aviation acci-
dents may offer some useful lessons for the FDA.
To avoid the apparent conflict, commentators have recommended the
creation of a completely independent drug safety board to compile and
review drug product safety and efficacy data.244 Such a board would by-
pass manufacturer tendencies to discount negative safety information
and would counteract the FDA's natural hesitancy to confess error when
a drug it just approved generates unusual and unexpected rates of ad-
verse reactions. The independent board might oversee a requirement for
mandatory postmarket data collection among a representative popula-
tion of patients with typical conditions and duration of treatment for the
particular drug.45 In addition, the independent board could investigate
specific instances or patterns of ADRs, and it could make regulatory re-
form or policy recommendations to the FDA so that the agency could
reduce the risk of similar events in the future.246
Finally, CDC, which like the FDA, is a unit of the Public Health Serv-
ice in the Department of Health and Human Services, might undertake
the role of a disinterested "drug safety board. ' ,247 Because the FDA
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1998, at A16.
243. See id. (describing how the NTSB directs investigations into transportation acci-
dents "using the people, expertise and equipment of other Government agencies, the pi-
lots' unions and the companies involved in the accident").
244. See Wood et al., supra note 36, at 1852-53. For example, the board would assume
responsibility for compiling safety data, investigating reports of drug toxicity, and recom-
mending to pharmaceutical manufacturers or to the FDA actions to reduce the risks asso-
ciated with new drug therapy. See id.; see also Grady, supra note 197, at D7; Rochelle
Sharpe, Academics Call for Independent Board to Review Problems of Approved Drugs,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1998, at B7 (noting that experts have been calling for an independ-
ent board since the 1970s).
245. See Wood et al., supra note 36, at 1852. These commentators have also proposed
that the independent drug safety board collect and analyze comparative data on the safety
of different drugs used to treat the same condition. Surprisingly, such data is not routinely
gathered or analyzed by the FDA currently. See id. at 1853. The authors added that such
data can also be used to confirm the validity of surrogate end points sometimes used for
marketing approval of a new drug. Once sufficient data on a new drug becomes available,
the drug safety board might be able to confirm that, for example, a drug which is proven to
reduce high blood pressure also has a long term positive benefit for morbidity or mortality
associated with high blood pressure, while maintaining an acceptable safety profile. See
id.; see also Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 241, 262 (1999) (discussing the regulatory relevance of denominating hy-
pertension as a free-standing disease entity).
246. See Wood et al., supra note 36, at 1852.
247. The FDA and the CDC already work cooperatively to run the Vaccine Adverse
Event Reporting System (VAERS). The VAERS system receives spontaneous reports
from the public, health care professionals, and vaccine manufacturers. Interestingly, the
CDC also recently implemented an active vaccine adverse event system using data from
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would remain responsible for the initial pre-approval safety evaluation for
all new drugs, the CDC, in the role of safety monitor, could provide an in-
dependent analysis of safety data as it becomes available. Moreover, the
CDC has the requisite biostatistical and epidemiological expertise to per-
form the task effectively, and the capability to conduct quick follow-up in-
vestigations in the field. Commentators have called for greater epidemiol-
ogical expertise at the FDA, noting that the number of trained
epidemiologists at the agency has declined in recent years and suggesting
that the FDA utilize outside resources.248 The FDA and CDC are ideally
situated to play the independent and complementary roles necessary to
improve prescription drug safety and the overall quality of patient care.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FDA, together with physicians and clinical researchers, should re-
think the existing approach to the monitoring of unexpected side effects
associated with prescription drugs. The increased pace of new drug ap-
proval demands a concomitant retooling of the post-approval monitoring
process, with an emphasis on directing significant additional resources to
the task. In addition, pharmaceutical manufacturers must be encouraged,
or even required, to commit more resources to drug safety tracking and
testing. The FDA has rightly decided that it is important to increase the
speed with which new drugs are approved for marketing. Now it must re-
spond to the volume of safety data that this more efficient approval proc-
ess creates. Once the FDA has designed improved safety monitoring sys-
tems, Congress must respond with budgetary support and amended
statutory authority, as needed. Ultimately, however, the agency can im-
prove the ADR monitoring system only to a limited extent. Physicians
and other health professionals remain responsible for making individual-
ized prescribing decisions, and the FDA must do its part to ensure that
physicians have the best possible information on which to base medication
choices for their patients.
four health maintenance organizations. See Timothy Brewer & Graham A. Colditz, Post-
marketing Surveillance and Adverse Drug Reactions: Current Perspectives and Future
Needs, 281 JAMA 824, 826 (1999).
248. See Gerald A. Faich, Letter to the Editor, Postmarketing Surveillance: Beyond
MedWatch, 270 JAMA 2180 (1993). Dr. Faich opined:
Stimulating reporting without providing resources to ensure adequate follow-up
and epidemiologic assessments is only a partial solution.... While the agency
has increased preapproval resources and activities, the proportion of manpower
and funding allocated for postapproval work has actually declined .... [The
FDA should] provide for expanding internal and external epidemiologic exper-
tise.
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